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City auditor flags ALPR audit gaps and vendor contract risks; commission approves recommendation with amendment
Summary
The city auditor’s ALPR audit found generally compliant quarterly audits but recommended formalizing schedules and roles; it also raised a contract concern about vendor metadata retention. The Public Safety Commission voted to approve a recommendation (6 yes, 1 abstain) and amended the scan‑count number in the recommendation language.
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The City Auditor’s office presented an audit of Austin Police Department automated license plate reader (ALPR) operations and found that APD risk management’s quarterly audits generally complied with policy but needed stronger formalization, scheduling and role definition. The auditor also flagged potential contract language that could allow a vendor to retain or share anonymized metadata indefinitely unless the contract is tightened.
Jake Perry, the auditor in charge of the ALPR project, told the commission that the audit covered the ALPR trial period beginning March 2024 through December 2024 and that APD provided a fourth quarterly risk‑management audit on May 21, 2025. Perry said APD’s metadata had gaps that prevented precise verification of some totals and that the audit verified approximately 17,000,000 scanned plate events in the trial period but noted the metadata caveats. The audit found about 133 prosecutions tied to ALPR outcomes during the covered period, six instances of data sharing, and three “unjustified” stops identified in quarter four (stops that did not match resolution‑sanctioned reasons); zero unjustified stops appeared in the first three quarters.
Perry recommended APD automate data pulls and anonymization where possible, adopt a written and consistent audit schedule, clearly define staff roles for auditing and formalize user‑compliance reviews so that officers’ documented reasons for ALPR use meet policy and resolution requirements. He also recommended that APD regularly report audit results to relevant stakeholders on a set schedule.
The audit included a contract observation: the city’s agreement with vendor Flock Safety, as written, used broad language allowing the vendor to retain and use “aggregated data” and did not define anonymization or personally identifiable information in a way the auditors considered sufficiently specific. The auditors said they observed no evidence that vendor data had been shared improperly, but they cautioned the contract language could allow broader retention or sharing unless tightened.
Commissioners pressed APD staff on who reviews camera locations, the chain of custody for metadata and whether regional partners or federal actors can access city data through vendor systems. APD staff and risk managers said the department has not identified improper external access and that formal requests for data provided during the trial period followed the resolution’s limited purposes (for example, investigations into homicide, human‑trafficking or stolen vehicles). APD said it will continue discussions with vendors and legal staff to tighten contract language.
The commission then considered a recommendation based on the audit and debate. Commissioners amended the draft recommendation to change a factual line about the number of scans; the amendment replaced a draft figure (75,000,000 scans) with 117,000,000 scans in the recommendation language. A vote to adopt the recommendation as amended passed on a show of hands: six in favor, zero opposed, one abstention. The recommendation language and the audit report will be provided to council for the work session on the item.
