Court of Appeals weighs whether DCFS interview on apartment landing was custodial for Miranda purposes in State v. Hansen

The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in State v. Hansen over whether statements made by the defendant during a doorstep interview were custodial for Miranda purposes and therefore required suppression.

Public defender Jennifer Foresta argued the initial interview at the defendant’s apartment was compelled and non‑voluntary because government agents limited Hanson’s freedom of movement, repeatedly ordered her to go outside to speak, and kept an officer between Hanson and her child. Foresta told the court that officers repeatedly told Hanson, “You don’t have a choice right now. You need to go outside and talk to them,” and that the presence and conduct of the DCFS worker and two uniformed officers produced the same “inherently coercive pressures” associated with station-house questioning in Miranda.

State counsel Christopher Ballard responded that Hanson retained the ability to control the circumstances of the interview: she opened the door voluntarily, invited the workers in, suggested going onto the landing, and repeatedly positioned the door and herself during the conversation. Ballard urged the panel to view the interaction under the totality of circumstances and to give heavy deference to the trial court’s fact findings that Hanson was not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings were not required for the DCFS interview.

Argument touched on several doctrinal issues: (1) the threshold custody inquiry under Miranda—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter and leave; (2) whether the presence of a DCFS worker (a non‑law‑enforcement government agent responsible for child-safety decisions), together with uniformed officers, changed the coercive character of the encounter; (3) the role of a “support person” or family arrival (a grandmother briefly appeared but was not permitted to remain) in assessing coercion; and (4) the state’s concession that it did not brief harmlessness: Ballard acknowledged the state had not fully developed a harmless-error argument.

Foresta argued that the officers controlled the area, instructed who could be present, and blocked Hanson’s practical ability to leave; she urged suppression of statements and asked the court to reverse the conviction if it found a Miranda violation. Ballard told the court he believed the record showed Hanson directed or assented to most of the critical circumstances and that the setting lacked the station-house coercive pressures Miranda protects against. He also said that if the officers had plainly told Hanson she was not free to leave, that would be problematic for the state’s position.

Judges pressed both counsel on whether the initial “doorway/landing” exchange should be read as voluntary at its outset and whether the officers’ subsequent directives transformed the encounter into custodial questioning. Counsel also discussed Seibert and related doctrines governing two-step interrogation; Foresta argued the second, post‑Miranda statements depended on the first, un‑warned interview, and the state acknowledged the sequencing raised doctrinal questions.

The panel took the case under advisement and did not issue a decision at argument.