Utah Court of Appeals hears Hall v. Hobble Creek over whether 1940s deeds conveyed 'flood water' rights

The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument in two consolidated appeals, Hall v. Hobble Creek (Nos. 20220794 and 20220795), on whether deeds from the 1940s conveyed perpetual water rights or a narrower "flood water" interest and whether a municipal corporation in the chain of title precludes later owners from claiming those rights.

The question matters to landowners who say they rely on artesian springs and other local sources for irrigation and livestock and to Springville City, which purchased land and related water shares in the 1940s as part of a municipal water project. Appellant counsel Jamie Carpenter told the panel the deeds’ language and administrative records create disputed factual issues that should preclude summary judgment and require a trial. "The deeds themselves that the city has relied on...state in the deeds, the plain language that the city did not buy all water and water rights. There was a flood water right that was accepted from the sale of the land," Carpenter said.

The appeals arise from a long-running general stream adjudication that began in the 1930s and produced a proposed determination in 1986. According to filings and argument, landowners’ predecessors conveyed land and irrigation shares to Springville Irrigation Company in the 1920s and conveyed later to Springville City in the early 1940s. The 1944 conveyance to a buyer named Phillips used the phrase "except flood water," which the parties and the three-judge panel debated at length.

Springville City counsel (identified in the record as Jeffrey Gittens) and the court’s questioning emphasized that a municipal presence in the chain of title can block later claims deriving from transfers out of the municipality. Judge Ryan Harris quoted from a precedent, saying, "The fact that there was a municipal corporation in the chain of title precludes any claim by a subsequent owner to water rights stemming from a transfer of title out of the municipality." Gittens argued the district court correctly concluded the city could not constitutionally convey the diligence or other municipal water rights and that the documentary record supports the lower court’s decision. "The city was constitutionally prohibited from conveying any of the water rights or water shares that it had acquired," he told the panel.

Appellants pressed several lines of attack. Carpenter argued (1) factual disputes exist as to the meaning and extent of the term "flood water" in the deeds and whether percolating or artesian spring rights were reserved to landowners; (2) the authenticity and discoverability of certain historical documents (including a Springville Irrigation Company agreement) raise triable issues; and (3) longstanding procedural and notice questions—some objections to the proposed determination date back decades—affect whether the city may assert a contract-based claim now. Carpenter also pointed to affidavits and witness evidence (included in briefs) saying local users historically treated springs as retained by landowners.

The panel questioned whether "flood water" is a recognized term of art in Utah water law or an ordinary-language description. "I don't think anybody was able to cite us anything indicating that the term 'flood water' is some sort of term of art in the water rights world," Judge Harris observed, and pressed counsel on whether the phrase could be quantified by the state engineer as a point-of-diversion/beneficial-use claim. Carpenter said the term is ambiguous and that later affidavits and the administrative record support a disputed factual picture; Gittens responded that the constitutional bar on municipal conveyance makes the precise legal definition unnecessary to resolve the appeal.

Both sides also argued about Morgan and Eskelson (Utah precedents) and how those cases interact with transfers that occurred after statutory change in 1935 governing spring/percolating claims. Appellants relied on due-process and notice theories—arguing that claimants did not have adequate notice of the city's asserted legal theory until much later—while appellees pointed to recorded deeds and constructive notice, plus district-court findings tying the conveyances and municipal purpose to acquisition for the city's Bartholomew Canyon water project.

Counsel and the judges discussed transactional details the record shows: in at least one deeded sale the buyer (Phillips) paid $2,000 cash and five shares of Springville Irrigation Company stock as part of the consideration; Springville later sold land while "reserving" water interests in a deed containing the "except flood water" phrase; proposed-determination and administrative filings appear in the record in the 1970s–1990s; and some contested documentation (an addendum book prepared by a former Division of Water Rights employee) was published in 1991 and challenged by objectors. Appellants said important documents were disclosed to them in February 2019 and that the administrative record and county-recorder searches raised chain-of-title confusion.

No ruling was issued at argument. Judge Harris told counsel the court would take the matter under advisement and issue a decision when ready. "We'll take the matter under advisement as we almost always do, and we'll get you a decision as soon as we're reasonably able to do so," he said.

The appeals turn on mixed questions of law and historical fact (deed language, administrative filings, statutory changes, and whether a municipality's role in title defeats later claims), and the court’s forthcoming opinion will determine whether the district court's grant of summary judgment should stand or whether one or more factual issues require remand for trial.