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Bioethicist testifies Michigan’s 24‑hour wait, coercion screen and disclosures are consistent with informed consent
Summary
Duke bioethicist Dr. Farr Curlin testified that Michigan's statutorily required 24‑hour waiting period, coercion screening, and MDHHS disclosure materials align with established norms of informed consent and do not appear stigmatizing in the materials he reviewed.
Dr. Farr Curlin, a Duke University physician and bioethicist called as an expert by defendants, testified the Michigan statutes requiring a 24‑hour waiting period, coercion screening and statutorily prescribed disclosure materials are compatible with accepted norms of informed consent.
Curlin, qualified by the court as an expert in bioethics and informed consent (the court did not accept a broader qualification in medicine), told the judge and counsel he relied on his clinical experience, published medical‑ethics literature and review of materials supplied in the case, including the MDHHS informational packet.
On the 24‑hour waiting period: Curlin said a waiting period is not “magical” but is consistent with practices across medicine that give patients time to consider information before making irreversible choices. He told the court the period imposes some burdens — for example, return visits — but said those burdens are of a kind that can be ethically justified to protect a patient’s opportunity to make a considered, voluntary choice. He also said shorter periods such as 18 hours can provide similar benefits and that exceptions for urgent medical conditions are appropriate.
On MDHHS disclosures and fetal gestational images: Curlin said, based on the materials he reviewed in the binder provided by the state, that the MDHHS handout appeared “even‑handed” and scientifically grounded. He said he did not find language that he would describe as stigmatizing or as pressuring patients to continue a pregnancy, and that the development chart appeared reasonably accurate (he noted that he is not an embryologist).
On coercion screening and the physician requirement: Curlin described a requirement to screen for coercion as “reasonable” and consistent with protecting voluntariness — a core component of informed consent. He also testified that limiting abortion provision to physicians (rather than advanced practice clinicians) is consistent with state authority to set qualifications and may protect patients by ensuring those offering care have training to manage rare but serious complications.
Compensation and background: On the record Curlin said he charges $500 an hour and had billed approximately $21,000 for his work on this matter. He described his background as an internal medicine physician and hospice/palliative medicine specialist who teaches and researches clinical medical ethics and the intersection of medicine and religion.
Why it matters: Curlin’s testimony provides an ethical foundation for defendant‑state regulations, tying the statutory requirements to widely recognized informed‑consent principles (information, comprehension, voluntariness). That testimony will be part of the record the court uses in its forthcoming findings of fact and conclusions of law.
What the court ruled on qualification and scope: The court allowed Curlin to testify as an expert in bioethics and informed consent but limited (over an objection) any qualification presented as a general medical expert. Counsel for plaintiffs cross‑examined Curlin on his views about ACOG, whether he had clinical experience obtaining consent for abortion, and on his personal religious commitments; Curlin denied that his personal religious convictions biased his professional opinions in this case.
