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WMSC adopts three investigation reports after hazardous spill and two improper-movement near-misses
Summary
The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission adopted three investigation reports documenting a contractor rail-grinder hydraulic spill and two near-miss improper rail-vehicle movements; the commission approved the reports by unanimous vote and discussed staff and Metro corrective actions.
The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission voted unanimously to adopt three investigation reports presented at its April meeting: a hazardous-material spill by a contractor-operated rail grinder and two improper rail-vehicle movement incidents.
Mr. Quigley summarized the hazardous-spill investigation (Whiskey0365). On Aug. 7, 2024, contractor-operated rail grinder unit 8126 stalled near Foggy Bottom and later leaked hydraulic fluid after a hose fitting failed; approximately 50 gallons of hydraulic fluid spilled onto the track. No injuries or adverse environmental impacts were reported. Metro Rail and contractor personnel removed the unit from service, cleaned the track with absorbents, and ultimately removed the vehicle from Metro property; WMSC reported the vehicle left Metro property as of Jan. 24, 2025. Metro has increased hydraulic inspections and is reviewing maintenance schedules for rail grinders.
Two improper-rail-vehicle-movement reports were adopted (Whiskey0366 and Whiskey0367). Whiskey0366, involving red-line train 124 on July 21, 2024, found that a train operator misinterpreted rail-traffic-controller instructions, placed the train into stop-and-proceed without authorization and moved roughly 420 feet toward a passenger-occupied train 126 before the controller stopped the movement. The operator was removed from service and permanently disqualified from the rail-vehicle-operator position. Metro instituted staff notices and training: control-center procedures were amended to require controllers to verify terminal names when directions are given that will move a train opposite normal traffic flow; Metro held boot-camp sessions for controllers and a safety stand-down for operators.
Whiskey0367 documented an Aug. 17, 2024 event at Pentagon Station in which operator change-off practices failed: an operator boarded the wrong train end, did not complete the required visual/verbal change-off, entered stop-and-proceed without authorization and moved the train in the wrong direction about 144 feet before being stopped; no equipment damage was found in subsequent inspections. Investigators noted contributing factors including informal change-off practice and temporary single-person staffing in the rail operating control center. Metro is implementing corrective actions and cited an open CAP (C056) addressing recruitment and retention at the control center.
Commissioners discussed the reports during the meeting. Vice Chair and other commissioners emphasized the need for standardized, unambiguous radio communications and formalized change-off procedures to reduce room for operator error. Commissioner Conklin suggested the probable cause language emphasize the unauthorized stop-and-proceed movement; commissioners also urged Metro to create clear, documented handoff checklists so that operators and controllers have a record of train condition and operating-end changes.
The three investigation reports were adopted by roll-call vote, 6 yays and 0 nays. WMSC staff said the investigation findings prompted immediate procedural changes, refresher training, and corrective-action work that Metro continues to implement.
The commission adopted the reports as Whiskey0365, Whiskey0366 and Whiskey0367.
