Utah Court of Appeals hears arguments on enforceability of post‑marital alimony provision in Taylor v. Taylor

The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument in Taylor v. Taylor over whether a post‑marital agreement’s alimony provision is enforceable. Caroline Olsen, counsel for Jackie Taylor, urged the court to reverse the district court’s ruling that the provision was unenforceable and to treat gaps in the agreement as matters of interpretation the court (or a remand) can fill. Kevin Kahl, counsel for Mark Taylor, told the panel the agreement fails for indefiniteness and that essential terms for a payment obligation — how much, how measured and how paid — are missing.

Olsen argued the agreement contains the essential commitments: revocation of the prenuptial waiver of alimony and an agreement that Jackie would receive alimony calculated as a percentage of Mark’s income. "Contracts should be construed to avoid forfeiture," she said, urging the court to apply principles from Texas contract law (which the contract invokes) and Texas cases that permit courts to supply reasonable implementing terms. Olsen told the panel that testimony in the record shows Jackie understood the 20–30% range to refer to gross income and that, at worst, the case should be remanded for a hearing to resolve any remaining ambiguity.

Kahl responded that in a contract obligating one party to pay money to another, "the amount of the payment and the terms of payment are inescapably essential terms." He told the court the district judge properly treated the challenged provision as a failure of contract formation rather than a gap the court could fill. Kahl cited Texas authorities and argued the parties did not manifest a sufficiently definite agreement on how to calculate income, which he said could be interpreted in multiple ways and therefore is indefinite.

Panel questioning focused on two recurring issues: (1) whether the disputed language is an ambiguity that courts can resolve with extrinsic evidence or an indefiniteness/formation failure that prevents enforcement; and (2) which jurisdiction’s substantive rules the court should use when construing or filling gaps — the contract expressly refers to Texas law, but the underlying divorce occurred (and was litigated) under Utah law. One judge asked, "How do we know which set of general alimony rules the court should apply to reach that initial number?" Counsel for Jackie said the contract’s Texas‑law choice should guide gap‑filling, while also acknowledging that a remand for factual findings could resolve eligibility questions.

Both sides acknowledged practical remedies on remand: Olsen said her client would stipulate to a fixed percentage if that would simplify proceedings; Kahl said severing the disputed provision would not save the rest of the agreement if the calculation term was the "main purpose" of the bargain. Counsel also debated whether the income term should be measured as gross or net and whether the contract’s phrase "no less than 20% and no less than 30%" (as framed in counsel’s briefing and argument) sets clear floors or creates ambiguity about the formula and triggering conditions (for example, alleged infidelity).

The panel took the case under advisement and said a written decision will follow. No ruling was issued from the bench at the oral argument.

The record before the court includes references to Texas statutes and multiple Texas court opinions discussed by counsel; the panel repeatedly asked whether Utah or Texas law controls interpretation and whether any factual findings (for example, eligibility for spousal maintenance under Texas law or facts bearing on alleged infidelity) are necessary on remand.

The court’s eventual opinion will determine whether the alimony provision is enforceable as written, whether the challenged clauses are severable, and what law and tools the trial court may use on remand to calculate or resolve payment terms if the panel finds enforcement appropriate.