During oral argument before the Virginia Supreme Court in Boyette v. Sprouse, lawyers for the appellant and appellee sparred over whether a jury should have been given a "sudden emergency" instruction after a vehicle carrying Shannon Boyette was struck from behind, and whether the court should reconsider or abolish the doctrine altogether.

The issue reached the high court after a jury returned a verdict for Carrie Sprouse and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Appellant's counsel Braxton Hill argued the instruction was improper and urged the court to consider eliminating the doctrine, saying the instruction "is something like you would find at a rummage sale" and often allows juries "an easy way of avoiding instead of deciding the issue made by the evidence in the case." Hill also reserved three minutes for rebuttal.

Why it matters: The sudden-emergency instruction historically lets a jury consider whether a motorist confronted with an unexpected danger acted as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances. Abolishing or narrowing the instruction could change how negligence cases involving rapid, unforeseen events are tried in Virginia.

Hill told the court he was asking it to address both the sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction in this case and to "complete the job" the court began in the Hancock Underwood decision by limiting or eliminating the doctrine. Several justices questioned whether the broader abolition argument had been preserved for review. "Are you asking us to focus more about whether or not the instruction was properly given in this case, or are you also asking that this court essentially do away with the instruction?" Justice Kelsey asked. Hill said he was raising both questions but acknowledged the court could take them in either order.

Justice Kelsey and other justices observed that Hancock Underwood had suggested the sudden-emergency instruction adds considerations beyond the standard negligence framework. Quoting Chief Justice Lemons' language, Justice Kelsey said, "Unlike an unavoidable accident instruction, a sudden emergency instruction does not merely repeat the law of negligence. It adds new considerations to the negligence equation." The justices probed whether that added content justified keeping the instruction distinct from ordinary negligence instructions.

Appellee counsel Brandon Farrell responded that Sprouse "occupies the most favored position under the law," pointing to the jury verdict, the trial court ruling and a unanimous Court of Appeals decision affirming the instruction. Farrell urged judicial restraint, noting the record before the Supreme Court raised a narrower preservation issue: whether the evidence supported giving the instruction at trial, not whether the doctrine should be abolished statewide.

Farrell emphasized the trial judge's careful consideration, saying Judge Sanner "understood that this is an unfavored doctrine, but he was struck by the evidence, specifically the video, and that made it a jury issue." Farrell quoted the trial judge as telling the record he was not giving the instruction "willy nilly." Counsel for Sprouse also highlighted the dash-cam video and testimony the lower tribunals had viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee.

Throughout argument, justices pressed both sides on precedent and on how the sudden-emergency question had been treated in prior Virginia cases, including references to Hancock Underwood, Jones v. Ford, Chodorov v. Ely and other line-of-traffic decisions. Justices asked whether the relevant question for appellate review is whether reasonable trial judges could conclude the evidence permitted the jury to consider a sudden emergency. "Could a reasonable trial judge believe there's sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that there was a sudden emergency?" one justice asked, noting the trial judge and a three-judge Court of Appeals panel had so concluded.

Appellant counsel responded that the combination of factors in this case — including what he characterized as an appearance of a dog that was not seen by the defendant and a sudden stop ahead — did not, on these facts, justify the instruction because the unseen animal did not directly affect what the defendant driver observed. Counsel said the cases that have found sudden emergencies typically involved circumstances a driver simply could not foresee, such as a medical event or blinding sunlight.

No decision was announced from the bench. The court's questioning focused on the interplay between Virginia precedent and whether the sudden-emergency instruction conveys matters the general negligence instructions already cover. The Supreme Court will issue a written opinion resolving whether the instruction was appropriate in this case and whether any broader doctrinal change is warranted.