Kansas committee hears bill to bar state purchases of drones or components tied to specified foreign countries

The Kansas House Commerce Committee held a hearing on House Bill 2,293, which would prohibit state agencies and political subdivisions from purchasing drones, critical components, related services or finished goods if those items were produced in or owned by entities tied to countries the bill lists as "countries of concern." Revisor Reimer told the committee the measure would take effect for contracts entered into on or after July 1, 2025.

The bill defines a "country of concern" to include China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela and limits procurement of "critical components"—parts or software necessary for recording, storing or transmitting data. It also allows continued use of replacement parts acquired before July 1, 2025, but would bar acquiring new replacement components from a foreign principal after that date. The measure contains exceptions, including if a vendor has a prior Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) determination with no unresolved national security concerns or a national security agreement in effect; another exception allows an acquisition if the secretary of administration, after consulting the adjutant general, determines that failure to acquire the component would pose a greater threat to state security.

Advocates said the bill addresses national-security and supply-chain vulnerabilities. Jacqueline Diehl, who identified herself as a researcher and advisory-board member of the nonprofit State Armor, said federal warnings from the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) show risks tied to foreign-manufactured unmanned aircraft systems and their associated software. "Relying on a drone platform and software from a hostile foreign adversary country is both dangerous," Diehl said, and she cited concerns about data exfiltration and remote manipulation of features on battlefield systems.

Andrew Wiens of State Armor Action urged the committee to consider a broad procurement bar for finished goods from listed foreign principals, saying Chinese law can compel companies to provide data to Chinese authorities. "Taxpayers deserve a drone provider or multiple drone providers that can't be compelled to spy upon our critical assets and our critical infrastructure," Wiens said.

Legislative Research analyst Mike Ditch summarized how other states and federal authorities have approached the issue, noting that many state statutes rely on the Commerce Department regulation 15 CFR 7.4 to identify foreign adversaries and that some enacted state laws restricting certain real property or investments have faced court challenges. Ditch cited a pending appeal in Shen v. Simpson, where the Eleventh Circuit has granted partial injunctive relief and signaled potential federal-preemption concerns tied to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA).

Law enforcement officials and some county and municipal representatives opposed an immediate or uncompensated shift away from current equipment. Deputy Chief Adam Heffley of the Lawrence Police Department said his agency uses drones for search-and-rescue, crime-scene mapping and responses to armed threats and described a recent incident in which a drone identified explosives inside a residence before officers entered: "We were able to use the drone to identify this fatal threat prior to sending any human beings into the house, undoubtedly saving the lives of first responders on scene," Heffley said. He warned that U.S.-made alternatives can cost three to four times as much and that Lawrence's drone budget was cut to $0 for 2025 and planned to be $0 in 2026.

Majority Leader Chris Croft, a sponsor of the measure, argued that the legislation is measuring a national-security risk and seeks to accelerate domestic manufacturing. "Whatever you think about the company itself, but they have 70% of the market," Croft said, describing the national-security concern as the ability for a single vendor to aggregate sensitive data. Both proponents and opponents noted exceptions in the bill aimed at limiting immediate operational disruption; Revisor Reimer pointed committee members to language allowing acquisitions in narrowly defined circumstances.

No formal vote was recorded during the hearing. Committee members asked for follow-up briefings, including classified or closed security briefings for members with clearance and for staff to clarify the scope of the bill language that covers "final or finished goods." Representatives and committee staff said they would continue work before subsequent hearings.

The bill’s effective date, the list of countries the measure identifies, and the exceptions for CFIUS reviews or national-security agreements were repeated multiple times at the hearing. The committee scheduled additional consideration of HB 2,293 at a subsequent meeting.

Background and next steps: Revisor Reimer said the prohibition applies to contracts entered into on or after July 1, 2025, and that replacement components acquired before that date may continue in use. The committee asked Legislative Research and sponsors to provide further information, and members indicated they expect additional briefings, including more-detailed security briefings where classification permits.