Louisiana task force hears experts warn Chinese-linked devices, land purchases and research ties threaten critical infrastructure

BATON ROUGE, La. — The Task Force on Louisiana’s Critical Infrastructure met Oct. 21 to hear outside experts and state officials describe a range of threats they say foreign adversaries — especially the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — pose to the state’s military bases, energy systems and research institutions.

Senator Valerie Hodges, chair of the task force, opened the meeting by describing SR 204, the resolution creating the group, and saying the panel’s charge is to “study the real world threats that foreign adversaries pose to Louisiana’s critical infrastructure, including our US military bases, oil and gas production, refining facilities, energy generation, infrastructure, imports.”

The session featured three outside speakers: Chris Holton of the Center for Security Policy; Michael Lucci, founder of State Armour; and Dr. Jacqueline Deal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. They described what they called a coordinated, multi‑vector approach by hostile states that can include purchasing land near bases, embedding networked devices with hidden connections to overseas servers, and leveraging research partnerships to collect technical information.

Why it matters: Louisiana is home to multiple military installations and major energy infrastructure. Speakers told the task force that those characteristics make the state an attractive target for influence operations and technical access that — they argued — could be exploited in a crisis.

Experts’ case and examples

Chris Holton said much of the concern centers on devices and equipment that can both collect data and, in some cases, be controlled remotely. He referred to a 2019 Department of Energy seizure of a Chinese-made power transformer that, according to his remarks, contained a “backdoor mechanism” enabling remote control and noted long lead times to replace transformers. Holton told the task force that earlier estimates of 400 such transformers in the U.S. rose by about 156 during the subsequent presidential administration to “something like 556.” He described that as “a huge concern” for the electric grid.

Michael Lucci framed the PRC’s approach as “surrounding” an asset through multiple vectors — cameras, routers, supply chains, even personnel — so an adversary can collect signals and, in extremis, disrupt operations. Lucci pointed to litigation filed in states such as Florida and Nebraska alleging that certain consumer cameras and other devices “automatically send data back to China,” and he cited U.S. government advisories that have warned about Chinese-made cameras and routers as potential espionage threats.

Dr. Jacqueline Deal reviewed the PRC’s historical and doctrinal context, describing the People’s Republic of China’s United Front and military‑civil fusion strategies. She told the task force that a U.S. House Select Committee study identified Department of Defense research grants that produced publications co‑authored with researchers affiliated with Chinese institutions, and she highlighted one Army grant involving Louisiana State University that she said was “over $8 million” and produced co‑authored publications.

Land purchases and proximity to bases

Speakers raised examples in other states in which foreign buyers acquired land near U.S. military installations, including media‑reported cases around Laughlin Air Force Base and Grand Forks Air Force Base. Lucci and Holton advised that land purchases near bases can be used to “surround” sensitive assets; both said states such as Texas and Florida have passed measures limiting certain foreign influence or economic relationships. Senator Adam Bass, who represents a district that includes Barksdale Air Force Base, questioned the panel on land ownership near that base and said the issue had been discussed in prior state meetings.

Devices, routers and cameras

Panelists warned that networked consumer and industrial devices (routers, home and industrial surveillance cameras, solar inverters and other equipment) can present both privacy and operational risks. Lucci and Holton cited the example of a consumer camera maker, Lorex, which Nebraska and Florida have targeted with investigations or lawsuits, and argued that white‑labeling and resale can keep banned devices in circulation. Lucci said the federal National Intelligence Law (2017) requires Chinese entities to support state intelligence work and called that a legal basis for concern about devices that phone home to overseas servers.

Higher education and research collaborations

Dr. Deal described U.S. university research arrangements that, she said, can involve co‑authors and partners in China, sometimes including Chinese military‑affiliated research institutes. She highlighted the Select Committee report that examined several hundred Department of Defense grants and said more than a thousand publications resulted that included Chinese co‑authors; she called higher education “wide open” and cited Florida and Texas legislation that imposes reporting, disclosure and review requirements on foreign gifts, partnerships and campus entities.

State‑level remedies discussed

Speakers and several legislators discussed state policy options used elsewhere: procurement bans on specified foreign suppliers, tighter reporting and vetting of foreign gifts to universities, consumer‑fraud enforcement to remove devices sold with undisclosed foreign data flows, and targeted land‑ownership restrictions in law where legally permissible. Lucci and Deal repeatedly pointed to Florida and Texas as examples — for instance, Texas legislation that created research security oversight and a state cyber command and Texas and Nebraska actions to remove Huawei equipment or investigate router and camera vendors.

Utility response

Representing Entergy, Jody Montalaro said the company has an enterprise‑wide cybersecurity and physical security program, performs penetration testing and works with federal and state partners. “We take security very seriously,” Montalaro said, and he described layered technical controls, monitoring and employee training. He declined to share granular operational security details in the public meeting but offered to provide technical briefings to the task force.

What the task force did not do

The meeting was informational; no formal votes, motions or policy decisions were recorded. Legislators and staff discussed next steps and follow‑up, including potential legislation to adapt models used in Texas and Florida.

Ending

Senator Hodges closed by stressing the need for action at the state level and pledged to continue pursuing policy options. Panelists offered to share reports, slides and model legislation with the task force staff for further review.

Quotes used in this article come from remarks at the Oct. 21 task force meeting in Baton Rouge and are attributed to the speakers who made them.