May it please the court, Ricky Davis is entitled to post‑conviction relief in this case for three reasons, Joshua Hedrick told the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals during oral argument in Knoxville. Hedrick, counsel for appellant Ricky Davis, said trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the jury to hear that Davis had a prior conviction for causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon, for failing to challenge admissibility of prior gun possession, and for not objecting when a key witness’s prior statement was read into the record.

Hedrick framed the problem around State v. Faust, arguing that Faust identifies bifurcation as the preferred practice when an indictment links a homicide charge with a weapons/status offense that depends on prior convictions. “We note the better procedure,” he quoted from Faust, and said trial counsel’s failure to raise a bifurcation motion left the homicide jury exposed to prejudicial information that “undermines our confidence in the verdict.”

The three judges on the panel — Judge Jill Barty Ayers, Judge Tom Greenholtz and Judge Kyle Hickson of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals — pressed defense counsel on both Strickland prongs: deficient performance and prejudice. Judge Hickson emphasized the Sixth Amendment standard, telling counsel, “That’s not what the Sixth Amendment requires,” and noted that Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s deficiency undermined confidence in the outcome or that there is a reasonable probability the result would have been different.

The state, represented by Catherine Redding, argued that petitioner failed to prove either deficiency or prejudice. Redding said the record shows the petitioner refused to stipulate to the prior conviction, limiting counsel’s ability to offer a stipulation; she also pointed to local practice in Knox County and to post‑conviction findings indicating a trial court likely would not have granted a bifurcation motion. Redding told the court that even if the jury heard the prior, the overall trial record — including recorded admissions, threatening text messages minutes before the 911 call, video of the shooting, and footwear evidence linking the defendant to the shooter — makes it unlikely the trial outcome would have been different.

State counsel also noted the post‑conviction record does not include a contemporaneous limiting instruction directing the jury about the narrower purpose of the prior‑conviction testimony.

In rebuttal, counsel identified in the courtroom as “Mister Hunter” urged the panel that prejudice was not waived and argued that allowing the jury to hear a prior violent felony in a first‑degree murder trial removes key evidence protections and “undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process,” invoking the Strickland standard.

Throughout argument the bench probed whether the post‑conviction record allows a petitioner to prove what a particular trial judge would have done pretrial. Defense counsel warned that requiring trial judges to testify about hypothetical pretrial rulings would create problematic precedent. The state pointed to trial‑level rulings and related hearing transcripts as the basis for the post‑conviction court’s conclusion that a bifurcation motion would not likely have succeeded in the circumstances of this case.

The court took the arguments under advisement after counsel finished. No disposition was announced from the bench at the hearing.

Background and context: the issue centers on whether introducing a prior violent‑felony conviction during a homicide trial so prejudicially affects the jury that defense counsel’s failure to prevent that disclosure constitutes ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. Faust has been cited in Tennessee appellate decisions as identifying bifurcation or separating the weapons/status charge as a preferred procedure when prior convictions are an element of a separate count. Counsel on both sides debated whether Faust creates a duty, or only a persuasive best practice, and whether the petitioner met Strickland’s burden to show prejudice given the other evidence introduced at trial.

What was in the record: counsel for the state described evidence admitted at trial that included (per the state’s summary) the defendant’s statements to others describing the shooting, text messages with threats shortly before the shooting, video of the shooting that the state said was consistent with a witness description, and footwear evidence linking the defendant to the shooter. The clerk’s in‑court testimony about the prior conviction stated the nature of the offense (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon) but the transcript does not reflect a detailed recitation of the prior offense facts nor a contemporaneous limiting jury instruction in the materials available to the post‑conviction court.

Next steps: the panel did not announce a decision at argument. The court will issue an opinion after considering the briefs and the oral argument.