Appeals court hears dispute over reach and effect of 2011 Alimony Reform Act in Bowness v. Bowness
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Summary
The panel considered whether the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 automatically curtailed a preexisting separation agreement's alimony duration or whether a 2017 stipulation reaffirming prior orders left parties bound to the longer duration they negotiated. Counsel disputed whether the statute is self-executing or requires a modification filing.
The Appeals Court examined whether the 2011 Alimony Reform Act reduced a payor'wife's preexisting alimony obligation or whether a post-act 2017 stipulation between the parties re-affirmed the 2009 separation agreement and insulated the longer duration.
Attorney Robert Clark (appellant) argued the Act converted earlier awards into general-term alimony with durational limits and that a court could treat the statutory change as a material change in circumstances, but emphasized the Act does not automatically rewrite every preexisting private agreement without process. The justices questioned whether the Act is self-executing for durations or whether payors must still file complaints for modification under the statute'a point defense counsel acknowledged the parties did not pursue earlier modification steps.
Counsel for the appellee, Lynn Eisenman, said the 2017 stipulation explicitly pulled forward and reaffirmed prior termination dates and that the payor had an opportunity under the Act to seek modification earlier but chose not to. She urged the court to respect the parties'negotiated stipulation and to affirm the trial court's reading that the parties intended the 2017 entry to govern.
The panel explored whether the 2017 document'which states that 'in all other respects the prior orders of the court shall govern' should be read as an explicit opt-in to the longer duration or simply as a procedural reaffirmation subject to the Act's modification mechanics. The court reserved decision.