SJC hears challenge to billion-dollar punitive award; debate centers on remittitur, bifurcation and burden of proof

BOSTON — The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on [date not specified] heard argument over whether a jury's extraordinary punitive damages award in a wrongful-death suit against Philip Morris so tainted the trial that the compensatory verdict must be vacated or a new trial ordered.

Attorney Scott Chesson, arguing for the appellant, told the court the jury returned “a punitive damages verdict is a 100 times higher than the next highest verdict against Philip Morris here in this Commonwealth” and said that scale, coupled with evidence of corporate wealth, creates a presumption of passion and prejudice that can infect the entire decision-making process.

Chesson emphasized that the original punitive award was about $1,008,000,000 and that the trial judge later remitted the punitive award to a substantially lower figure; he argued that even if remittitur reduced the sum, the jury's initial conduct and exposure to evidence of the company's resources justified relief. He urged the court to recognize procedural safeguards for punitive damages, including bifurcated trials and a heightened burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence) to prevent juries from being swayed by a defendant's wealth.

Members of the bench questioned whether the remitted amount'not the original figure'controls the analysis and whether the record supports any presumption that the compensatory award was affected. A justice noted the trial judge had observed a deliberative jury that asked questions and made distinctions among family members in compensatory awards, and asked counsel what rule the court should adopt for reviewing very large punitive awards when a jury otherwise appeared attentive.

Appellee counsel Celine Humphreys, representing the Fontaine estate, told the court that the record supports the jury's verdict and that longstanding Massachusetts and federal precedents provide an outer constitutional limit on punitive awards that the trial court can enforce by remittitur. “We think that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence,” Humphreys said, noting that the punitive award represented only a short interval of the defendant's revenue and that the trial judge applied constitutional law in setting a reduced, enforceable amount.

The advocates debated how the U.S. Supreme Court's punitive-damages precedents (Haslip/BMW/State Farm) should interact with Massachusetts practice. Chesson argued remittitur after the fact does not fully cure the problem of exposing juries to wealth evidence and that many other jurisdictions have adopted procedural protections, while Humphreys said remittitur and judicial oversight provide a constitutionally appropriate check and that any change to trial procedures should be prospective.

Counsel also addressed related claims and evidence, including Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A and historical warnings on cigarette packaging. Humphreys clarified that the plaintiff did not bring a failure-to-warn claim but introduced evidence that Philip Morris removed stronger "addictive" warnings when it acquired certain brands; she said that evidence came in without objection and bore on the defendant's conduct and history rather than on statutory label requirements.

The justices pressed both sides on how to balance deference to a trial judge who observed the jury with the structural risk posed by evidence of wealth and multiple related lawsuits. The argument left unresolved whether the court will adopt an ex ante rule (such as mandatory bifurcation or a heightened burden) or continue to rely primarily on remittitur and constitutional limits reviewed on appeal.

The case returned to the court's decision docket following argument.