Mass. high court considers whether "least culpable" armed robbery meets pretrial "use of force" test

The Supreme Judicial Court heard argument on whether Massachusetts' pretrial-detention statute, G. L. c. 276, 58A, treats armed robbery as a categorical predicate when the least culpable forms of armed robbery may not involve "violent or substantial" force. Haley Jacobson, counsel for Domingo Agostini, argued that the "least culpable" armed robbery could be a person "who takes the hat off of someone's head and runs away while carrying a knife in their pocket," and that such conduct does not satisfy the statute's force requirement.

Jacobson told the court that although the legislature in 1994 included a "use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force" predicate in 58A, the residual clause that once supported treating armed robbery as a predicate was held void in 2019 and the legislature has not amended the statute since. "I think there can be little doubt that when the legislature first enacted [the statute] they intended for armed robbery to be a predicate offense for pretrial detention without bail," Jacobson said, but she argued that the court must consider the least culpable conduct that could be charged when assessing the statute's scope.

Jacobson relied on Massachusetts decisions such as Commonwealth v. Jones and Commonwealth v. Mora (as discussed during argument) to press that Massachusetts robbery can encompass sudden snatching or takings where the victim is only minimally aware, and so the quantum of force in the least culpable example is not "violent or substantial." She argued the armed-robbery weapon element does not change that analysis because a weapon need not be used or displayed and a victim may be unaware of its presence. "So in that sense, Mora controls this case completely because the dangerous weapon element just doesn't make a difference in terms of the quantum of force used for the least culpable armed robbery," Jacobson said.

The defense also addressed recent federal authority. Jacobson told the court that Stokeling v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Florida robbery and the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), "has very little effect on this case" and, if anything, supports the defense'''because the Massachusetts offense can include sudden takings that federal precedent found did not meet the ACCA force standard.

At the end of her argument, Jacobson asked the court to vacate the order holding Agostini without bail.

Rachel Eisenhower, arguing for the Commonwealth, replied that she was not asking the court to overrule Mora but urged the justices to "decouple the interpretation of [G. L. c. 276, 58A] from the interpretation of the ACCA on federalism grounds," emphasizing that federal ACCA precedent applies in a national context and therefore uses a neutral test across jurisdictions. "I'm not asking the court to overrule Mora. I'm asking the court to decouple the interpretation of 58A from the interpretation of the ACCA on federalism grounds because ACCA looks to predicate offenses that can be from anywhere," Eisenhower said.

Eisenhower argued that the 1994 legislature, when it enacted the force language, did so against a backdrop of Massachusetts common-law definitions and that those state-law definitions remain relevant to the interpretation of the statute. During back-and-forth questioning the court and counsel debated when federal ACCA case law should inform state statutory interpretation and when Massachusetts common-law precedent should control.

No formal decision was announced at argument. The court's questions and the parties' answers focused heavily on whether the court should analyze the "least culpable" version of armed robbery for pretrial-detention purposes and whether federal ACCA precedent should be treated as persuasive context or as controlling, given differences between state and federal definitions of robbery.

If the court adopts the defense's framing, it would limit the category of offenses that qualify as predicates for detention under G. L. c. 276, 58A to those versions of armed robbery involving violent or substantial force; if it adopts the Commonwealth's approach, it is more likely to view armed robbery as within the statute's force predicate based on Massachusetts precedent and statutory context.

The oral argument record includes extended discussion of case law including Commonwealth v. Jones, Commonwealth v. Mora, Campbell, Vera, and federal decisions such as Stokeling v. United States, as well as doctrinal questions about categorical-analysis methodology and the role of federal precedent in interpreting state statutes.