The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in MFRE v. Saratoga Springs (No. 20250146) over whether a municipality’s later notice and packet can effectively ‘‘replace’’ an earlier disclosure and restart statutory time periods tied to eminent‑domain proceedings.

Appellant counsel James Adam Noor told the three‑judge panel the central question is whether a landowner in a strict‑compliance setting can be left to guess which of multiple, substantially similar notices is operative. "When a person in a strict compliance environment provides a notice that is completely compliant but then muddies the waters with successive notices, the most recent notice controls," Noor said, urging the court to embrace a replacement principle similar to the one used in the Vermont Andrews decision.

The city, represented by counsel Bart *****, replied that the repeated communication simply reiterated landowners’ statutory entitlements and caused no prejudice. Bart ***** described the 2(b)(2) disclosure at issue as an advisory packet that lists rights — including the right to just compensation and to consult a property‑rights ombudsman — and argued sending the material again was "out of an abundance of caution" that "doesn't prejudice the landowner at all." He told the court the March 22 mailing also offered, "a full copy of the Atencio memorandum with exhibits," but that the original November disclosure satisfied the statute’s 30‑day requirement.

Judges questioned whether the February and March mailings were substantively different and pressed both sides on practical prejudice. One judge asked whether labeling a later mailing as an "addendum" would change the analysis; Noor answered that the difference would likely be immaterial when the government re‑sends a full packet (which, he said, ran "40 some odd pages"), because the recipient could reasonably infer the notice process had restarted. Noor contrasted that inference with the legislature’s choice to provide a fixed 30‑day negotiation window and argued the court should not let repeated municipal mailings erode that statutory protection.

The court also spent significant time on how local agendas are structured. Appellant argued a letter telling MFRE it would be "heard" contradicted a public agenda listing the item as a consent item "which may be approved without discussion or public comment," creating a real risk of confusion about whether MFRE would actually be allowed to present oral remarks. City counsel countered that the March letter explicitly assured MFRE the right to be heard, that written comments were considered by the council, and that, in practice, agendized consent items can be moved or a party affected by a business item is treated as an applicant and permitted to speak.

At the outset the panel acknowledged an earlier oversight in failing to rule on pending motions to expedite and on a motion asking the court to resolve the case without a written opinion. Counsel said those motions were not opposed. The panel said it would be mindful of those filings as it takes the case under advisement. "We'll take the matter under advisement, as well as being mindful of the motions to expedite," the presiding judge said before recessing the court.

What happened next: The panel did not issue a decision at the argument. The court took the case under advisement and indicated it would consider the pending motions to expedite and the request to decide without a written opinion.