Alabama Supreme Court hears arguments over whether municipal notice law blocks child-abuse suits by minors
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Summary
The Supreme Court of Alabama heard argument on whether the municipal notice-of-claim statute (Ala. Code §11-47-23) bars child-abuse suits by minors despite tolling under Ala. Code §6-2-8(b); justices took the case under advisement after extended questioning.
The Supreme Court of Alabama on the bench heard competing arguments over whether the state—s municipal notice-of-claim requirement prevents minors who were abused from bringing suits against cities, despite a 2019 amendment to the tolling statute, Ala. Code —6-2-8(b).
Appellants— counsel urged the court to "harmonize" the statutes so that minors do not lose their right to sue before reaching majority. "An Alabama child should not lose their rights to justice before they are even old enough to walk into a courthouse," appellants' counsel told the court, arguing the 2019 amendment extends tolling for specified child-abuse offenses and does not exclude municipalities from that protection.
Counsel for the cities argued otherwise. Michael Jackson, representing the city of Irondale, told the justices that plaintiffs had waived some arguments by not raising them at the trial level and stressed the court—s longstanding precedent, including the Pardon/Parton line of cases and City of Birmingham v. Weston, which have required notice to municipalities within six months. "There haven—t been any material changes or updates," Jackson said, arguing the notice rule protects municipalities— ability to investigate claims and preserve evidence.
Joseph Abrams, representing Birmingham, echoed that view while expressing sympathy for the victims. Abrams said the municipal notice statute is a condition precedent that bars recovery against municipal defendants when not satisfied and noted the record shows notice to the cities was filed years after the six-month statutory period. "Because of that noncompliance with the notice-of-claim statutes, the appellants are barred from recovery from only the municipal defendants in this case," Abrams said.
Justices pressed both sides on whether intervening statutory changes required overturning prior precedent. Justice Cook asked how the court could rule for appellants without overruling the earlier Pardon/Parton decision; appellants— counsel replied that the law had changed substantially since that decision and that the legislature—s 2019 amendment reflected a new policy protecting child victims.
Appellants— counsel proposed a narrow harmonization: in cases where no trusted adult filed timely notice, a minor could have a six-month window after turning 19 to present a claim to the city. The cities countered that allowing such an exception would substitute judicial for legislative policymaking and would undermine the statutory purpose of prompt notice to municipalities.
After extended questioning and back-and-forth over waiver, statutory text, legislative intent and precedent, the Court took the case under advisement and adjourned. No decision was announced.
The appeal involves consolidated cases from Jefferson Circuit Court (docket nos. SC20240734 and SC20240788) and turns on the interplay between Ala. Code —11-47-23 (municipal notice of claim) and Ala. Code —6-2-8(b) (tolling for certain child-abuse claims).
