Appeals court weighs arbitration‑appeal and 'defective verdict' issues in Callas Pobrito v. Balu

The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in Callas Pobrito v. Balu on two principal issues: (1) whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal following a district‑court de novo trial that arose from a statutory 03/21 arbitration provision and (2) whether the trial court mishandled a defective or incomplete jury verdict and improperly influenced the jury when attempting to correct it.

Appellant counsel first urged the panel to treat the question of appealability as a predicate jurisdictional matter. Counsel stressed the statutory nature of the right to appeal and urged caution in expanding appeal rights from what the legislature specified for certain arbitration schemes.

The panel then turned to the trial‑level controversy. Appellant described a jury verdict in which the foreman returned a signed form that allocated fault (the parties refer to a 70/30 allocation) but did not include a damages number; trial counsel and the judge discussed the form at sidebar, and the judge later addressed the jury in open court to describe two plausible explanations for the defect (either the jury failed to award damages or the jury transposed allocations). Appellant argued the judge’s remarks risked polarizing the jury and impermissibly suggested what the correct fix should be instead of neutrally reinstructing the panel to complete the outstanding questions.

Appellee framed the same record differently. Appellee argued the verdict was defective (either informal or insufficient under Rule 47S), that a reasonable judge could describe the two plausible alternatives to the jury, and that there was no record evidence showing the judge had improperly pushed the jury toward a particular outcome. Appellee also emphasized that the trial evidence — centered on whether a driver entered on red or green and on precise timing in the intersection — supported the overall factual outcome and that the judge’s intervention was within the broad discretion trial courts possess when confronted with a defective form.

The panel questioned counsel about alternative procedures (for example, sending the jury back without substantive comment versus offering limited explanation), about whether a seven‑minute deliberation gap supported an inference of confusion, and about the appellate standard for reviewing a trial court’s reinstruction and neutrality. Several justices emphasized the risk that a bare instruction to "go finish the form" could leave jurors uncertain whether they could change prior answers, while others noted the trial judge must sometimes offer context to prevent further confusion.

The court did not rule from the bench. The panel thanked counsel for their arguments and took the case under advisement to consider both the jurisdictional and defective‑verdict questions.