Hudson Institute scholar warns Michigan lawmakers of CCP risks to minerals, AI, biotech and universities

Michigan House Committee on Homeland Security and Foreign Influence · November 13, 2025

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Summary

Michael Sobolik told the Michigan House committee that the Chinese Communist Party poses multifaceted risks to U.S. national security and Michigan's industries, citing vulnerabilities in critical minerals, robotics/AI components, biotechnology data flows, and higher-education ties to PRC nationals.

Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and an advisory-board member of the Vandenberg Coalition, told the Michigan House Committee on Homeland Security and Foreign Influence that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is "not a normal government" and is working to "reshape the world to its advantage" through influence, supply-chain control and data collection.

Sobolik opened his virtual testimony by identifying four priority vulnerabilities for U.S. security: critical minerals, robotics (and AI), biotechnology and higher education. He said China controls "roughly 85% of global rare earth processing" and that many U.S. defense systems and clean-energy technologies depend on those supply chains, leaving the country exposed.

On robotics and AI, Sobolik warned that U.S. systems depend on hardware and software components that "China is eager to control," and that embedded Chinese-made sensors or other parts could provide channels for data exfiltration, intellectual-property theft or sabotage. "Embedding PRC made components into American robots presents real risks," he said, noting examples of Chinese suppliers with U.S. facilities.

Turning to biotechnology, Sobolik cited the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center's framing that "your DNA is the most valuable thing you own" and said state-backed firms such as BGI Group have built large genetic databases. He recounted that Thermo Fisher Scientific sold sequencing equipment to Chinese authorities in Xinjiang and later stopped sales after public pressure, presenting that episode as illustrative of how commercial transactions can support abusive uses of genetic technology.

Sobolik also described several incidents involving PRC nationals and research facilities, including allegations tied to the University of Michigan. He linked those cases to a broader concern: many U.S. universities rely heavily on tuition from Chinese nationals for revenue and thus can face incentives that complicate security and oversight.

Throughout the hearing, Sobolik recommended concrete steps for state leaders, including vetting foreign investments, scrutinizing university partnerships (especially in sensitive STEM fields), encouraging domestic refining and manufacturing for critical minerals, and improving transparency around foreign lobbying or influence. He praised Michigan's earlier action pushing back on certain Chinese-linked investments and suggested the state could play a leading role nationally.

The committee approved its minutes at the start of the session and, after questioning, excused absent members before adjourning.