The Utah Court of Appeals on the Madison Courthouse bench heard argument in State v. Allred over a continuous protective order that prevents the defendant from contacting his biological children. "This case is about father's right to maintain a relationship with his minor children," said Brian Craig, counsel for appellant Allred, arguing the district court misread the statute and wrongly included household members beyond the named victim.

Craig told the three‑judge panel that the district court relied on a cross‑reference that appears to cite the wrong subsection and that invoking the scrivener's‑error doctrine was necessary to correct what he described as a typographical mistake in Utah Code §78B‑7‑805(3). He argued the statute's plain wording—referring "between the perpetrator and the victim"—does not encompass other household members, and that the order at issue is particularly severe because it has no expiration date: "This protective order has no expiration," Craig said, noting the cohabitant abuse protective order statute cited by the defense carries a three‑year expiration.

The panel pressed Craig about remedies and procedures. He stressed that the order was entered four months after sentencing while his client lacked counsel and that the district court denied a full evidentiary hearing and the opportunity to call and cross‑examine witnesses. "An order that prohibits all contact between a parent and a child is a critical stage," Craig told the court, saying that absent counsel at issuance the order should be voidable and required a subsequent evidentiary hearing to satisfy due process.

For the state, Daniel Day argued the district court did not abuse its discretion. Day said the district court's reading was confirmed by a later legislative correction of the cross‑reference and by the statute's preamble, which permits consideration of the safety of "any member of the victim's family or household." He told the panel the technical notice defects were harmless because Allred promptly obtained counsel two days after being served and requested a hearing. "The facts here clearly support" the order, Day said, pointing to plea admissions and victim statements the state said were sufficient for clear and convincing evidence.

The judges questioned both sides about the legal standard for applying a scrivener's‑error or absurdity doctrine, the practical effect of a retroactive legislative amendment, and whether a protective order entered after sentencing is part of the "critical stage" that triggers a right to counsel. The state and the bench agreed the scrivener's‑error doctrine must be narrowly applied, while the appellant emphasized separation‑of‑powers concerns if courts rewrite legislative text.

No decision was announced. Judge Clayton Warren said the court would take the matter under advisement and issue either an opinion or an order in due course; the panel recessed and scheduled further proceedings at the Madison Courthouse the following day.

The appeal turns on three linked legal questions: whether the district court properly read and, if necessary, corrected the statutory cross‑reference; whether post‑sentencing entry of a continuous protective order that bars parental communication may be entered without counsel present at issuance; and whether any procedural defects were harmless given later notice and a subsequent hearing. The court's ruling will affect how Utah trial courts handle protective orders that implicate parental rights and how narrowly appellate courts apply scrivener's‑error and absurdity doctrines.