A three-judge panel of the Utah Court of Appeals heard argument Tuesday in State of Utah v. Cassie Tolman over whether the trial court erred by allowing three children to testify remotely and whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial.

Appellant counsel Laila Mahmood argued the trial court granted the State’s motion under Rule 15.5 without the required individualized findings that each child would suffer serious emotional or mental strain or would testify unreliably if required to testify in front of Tolman. “The state did not show that here,” Mahmood told the panel, saying the trial court relied on generalized statements (the children’s ages and that they would be more comfortable in an intimate setting) rather than an evidentiary showing required by the rule.

Mahmood also argued the remote testimony prejudiced Tolman in several ways: jurors observed the defendant being removed from the courtroom and placed “in a kiosk on a different floor” for the children’s testimony, the three children’s testimony consumed roughly three and a half hours of trial time, and for portions of that testimony Tolman’s camera was turned off and she was muted. Mahmood said those facts undermined the jury’s ability to make credibility determinations and hampered counsel’s ability to consult with the client during testimony.

The appellant additionally raised ineffective-assistance claims tied to trial counsel’s evidentiary strategy. Mahmood said trial counsel repeatedly made relevance objections when a hearsay objection might have excluded officer testimony about Child Justice Center (CJC) interviews and that the State’s witnesses effectively bolstered the children’s testimony. “If counsel actually wanted to have a chance of excluding this testimony, the objection he should have made was a hearsay objection,” she told the court.

During questioning, an unidentified member of the panel probed the prejudice analysis and the counterfactual of how in‑person testimony might have changed juror responses. That justice observed it was not obvious whether in‑court testimony would have made the children more or less likely to provide damaging testimony, and asked how a court should weigh that in a prejudice inquiry. Mahmood responded the record and Rule 15.5 deficiencies mean the defendant’s confrontation rights were implicated and that the absence of individualized findings was reversible error.

State counsel Karen Klusnick countered that the record is inadequate to find ineffective assistance under Strickland because a court must assume reasonable trial strategy where the record is silent. Klusnick noted instances where the record shows defense counsel asked relevance questions and suggested strategic reasons for that choice, including the risk that a hearsay objection might prompt the State to play the underlying CJC videos. She urged the panel to assume a reasonable tactical explanation absent proof to the contrary and to affirm the convictions.

Panel discussion also addressed preservation and post‑conviction record development: Klusnick argued that where the trial record is incomplete the appropriate vehicle to develop counsel’s reasons is a 23(b)-type postconviction motion, while Mahmood responded the record here is sufficiently developed and demonstrates objectively unreasonable choices.

The court took the matter under advisement and told counsel it would issue a written decision in due course.