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Planning board upholds director’s determination that boat storage can be allowed as a similar C‑2 use after lengthy legal debate

Flagler County Planning Board · October 21, 2019
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Summary

After extended legal debate and public comment, Flagler County’s planning board denied the appeal of the planning director’s determination that 'boat storage' is a use similar to prior boat manufacturing on a C‑2 parcel; the board voted 4–1 to uphold the director, but residents urged a written legal opinion and said the proposed use is more intensive than earlier operations.

The Flagler County planning board voted 4–1 to deny an appeal challenging the planning director’s determination that 'boat storage' may be permitted as a use similar to previously approved 'boat manufacturing' on a C‑2 parcel at the Hammock Harbor site.

Appellant counsel (Mister Baer) told the board the planning director overstepped by deciding that 'boat storage' is a permitted similar use in the C‑2 district. Counsel said boat storage is not listed as a C‑2 permitted use, that the proposed development replaces a prior manufacturing shed with a significantly larger building (counsel described the prior structure as roughly 200 by 25 feet and the proposed as about 420 by 135 feet), and that the planned program — including 120 parking spaces, forklift operations, and a 10,000‑gallon fuel tank — represents a materially more intensive use that should have required a special exception or rezoning.

Adam, the planning director, defended his prior determination in the hearing. He summarized his interpretive approach as: if the land‑use form allows building a certain envelope, an owner may store items inside that envelope — a shorthand he described as, "if you could build it, you could store it." He clarified he was not endorsing outside storage (which is prohibited in the Scenic A1A corridor) and acknowledged that the question was nuanced and that site‑plan details (parking, fuel, and traffic) would be evaluated separately by the technical review committee.

The legal point before the board was narrow: did the planning director have the authority to classify an unlisted use as 'similar' under the C‑2 code, and if so, was that classification correct? Counsel for the appellant cited code history and a court case (Dixon v. City of Jacksonville) to argue the director should not have made the determination. County attorney Miss Stengel and several board members reviewed code language, including a provision in Section 303.17 (C‑2) stating that "other commercial uses of a nature similar to those listed may be permitted upon determination by the planning board," and a chapter provision delegating code interpretation responsibility to the planning director. Board members disagreed about which provision applied and whether the planning director’s decision was an appropriate administrative interpretation or an issue that required a full planning‑board special exception hearing.

Residents and local stakeholders gave extended public comment. Jan Sullivan and others said the proposed boat storage was "hardly less intense" than manufacturing, pointing to a planned restaurant, 120 parking spaces, and forklift activity running daytime hours. Several residents asked for a written legal opinion from county counsel before the board decided; Steve Hatcher explicitly urged a formal written opinion from Flagler County’s house counsel.

After debate about code structure, precedent, and the balance between administrative interpretation and public hearing rights, a motion to deny the appeal (thereby upholding the planning director’s determination) passed 4–1. Board members who supported denying the appeal cited ambiguity in the code and precedent for administrative interpretation; dissenting members said the scale and intensity of the proposed development merited a special‑exception process and broader public review. The board’s decision can be appealed to the county commission.