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North Dakota Supreme Court Hears Challenge to District Court's Reformation of 1989 Will

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Summary

Attorneys for Cynthia Ulmer and Amanda Miller disputed whether a district court properly reformed Randall Moe's 1989 will to benefit Miller. Appellant said the will's plain language controls; appellee said testimonial and financial evidence supported reformation. The court took the case under advisement.

The North Dakota Supreme Court on oral argument considered whether a district court properly reformed the 1989 will of Randall (Randy) Moe to create a trust-like arrangement benefiting his daughter Amanda Miller rather than leaving property outright to Cynthia Ulmer.

Appellant counsel William Black told the justices the district court's order improperly overrode "the principle of testamentary freedom," arguing that the will's plain language must be enforced and that testimony decades after the document was executed cannot satisfy North Dakota's clear-and-convincing standard for reformation. Black noted the will was executed December 12, 1989, and said there was no evidence Randy took steps to revoke or alter the instrument in the ensuing 30 years.

In response, appellee counsel Aaron Weber argued reformation is an equitable remedy available when "justice and conscience so dictate," and said the district court relied on a uniform pattern of testimonial and documentary evidence showing that Randy intended to provide for Amanda. Weber told the court the trial record included multiple non-interested witnesses and financial accounts naming Amanda or her children as beneficiaries or co-owners, which the appellee urged supported the district court's finding of intent despite the will's literal wording.

The attorneys debated legal and evidentiary points. Black pressed that much of the testimonial record consisted of recollections years after execution and therefore did not point to the testator's intent at signing. He also objected to the weight or admission of attorney/expert testimony from Robert Manley as involving legal conclusions. Weber countered that the district court applied the statutory and restatement frameworks for reformation and that, even if portions of the expert testimony addressed legal matters, the conclusion would be harmless if the statutory and factual findings independently supported reformation.

The parties differed over how to read related documents: Black highlighted probate values (roughly $1,213,000) versus "about $700,000" in non-probate transfers and said there was no contemporaneous evidence tying those transfers to intent at execution; Weber described the financial-designation evidence and consistent witness testimony as corroborating the district court's assessment.

Both sides answered multiple questions from the justices, including whether evidence of intent may legitimately come from events before or after execution, how to treat potential inducements in will language, and the legal distinction between reformation and revocation. Weber told the court the district court's order reformed clause three to "provide for a trust right like relationship" for Amanda rather than effecting an active revocation, and asked the Supreme Court to affirm.

After rebuttal from Black, the court did not announce a decision. A court officer said, "This case will be taken under advisement as all cases are," and the argument concluded. The Supreme Court will issue a written decision at a later date.

Next steps: the court has taken the appeal under advisement; no ruling was announced at argument.