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Appeals court weighs whether Rule 60 ruling blocked petitioner from adding appellate‑counsel IAC claim
Summary
In Peterson v. State, a three‑judge Utah Court of Appeals panel heard arguments over whether the district court erred treating pro se filings as a Rule 60(b) motion and dismissing layered ineffective‑assistance claims as frivolous, and whether the court should have appointed counsel. Judges debated remand versus directing the motion to be granted.
Judge Ryan Tenney and a three‑judge panel heard oral argument in Peterson v. State over whether the district court misapplied Rule 60(b) and Rule 15(a) in dismissing post‑conviction claims and whether counsel should have been appointed. Dane Smallland, attorney for the appellant, told the court the petition did not seek to vacate Mr. Peterson’s convictions but instead asked the court to "advance the policy behind both rule 15 and rule 60" so litigants receive a full hearing on meritorious claims. He argued that the pro se filings met the low pleading burden and that the various judicial standards invoked in PCRA practice amount to a facial‑frivolous check rather than a high‑threshold merits ruling.
The panel focused on whether the district court treated the submission as Rule 60(b)(1) (timeliness/excusable neglect) or Rule 60(b)(6) (catchall) and on what “meritorious” review means in that context. Judge Amy Oliver pressed counsel that "merit" seems higher than mere non‑frivolousness, and the court discussed case law the parties cited. Smallland urged the court to view meritoriousness as the same low bar used in the PCRA and summary review—essentially a check for claims "frivolous on the face of the pleading."
The panel also examined whether reversing the Rule 60(b) ruling would require the appellate court to issue an advisory direction about granting a Rule 15(a) motion to amend, or whether the matter should be remanded for additional district‑court findings. Smallland said the appellate court could both find the 60(b) factors met and either mandate or leave the motion‑to‑amend question for the district court to resolve in the first instance. The judges repeatedly returned to the same practical question: if appellate review finds the 60(b) analysis legally flawed, should the case be remanded to allow the district court to make required timeliness and excusable‑neglect findings?
The State (Daniel Ditford) responded that the district court acted within its broad Rule 60 discretion, that Peterson was effectively asking to relitigate claims already dismissed as meritless, and that appointment of counsel was not required under the PCRA’s statutory factors at the time the request was made. Ditford told the court the district court’s process had given Peterson opportunities to present the mailing/excusable‑neglect arguments and that, even under a limited merits review, the underlying claims remained subject to dismissal.
After a brief rebuttal from Smallland emphasizing that trial‑IAC claims previously found non‑frivolous supported adding an appellate‑IAC layer, the panel submitted the matter for decision. "This is an extraordinarily complicated case," Judge Tenney said, and the court thanked counsel; the case was submitted for opinion.
