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Utah Court of Appeals Questions Whether Premarital Assets Became Marital in Krajewski Appeal
Summary
The Utah Court of Appeals heard argument in Krajewski v. Krajewski over whether large premarital accounts remained separate or were converted to marital property by commingling; judges also probed a housing-related alimony award and a pretrial attorney-fee ruling. The court took extensive questioning and will issue a written decision.
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At a morning session of the Utah Court of Appeals, the three-judge panel heard oral argument in Krajewski v. Krajewski, a family-law appeal focused on whether substantial premarital assets were converted into marital property and on the size and geographic basis of an alimony-related housing award.
“I’m not going to try to pronounce the names,” the panel chair said as he announced the case, and counsel for both sides then stated appearances. Appellant counsel Julie Nelson told the court that Utah precedent protects a married person’s right to keep separate property separate and urged the panel to treat the DJK operating account and several Morgan Stanley accounts as premarital, traceable assets rather than marital property. “There are three ways to combine separate property into marital property — commingling, contribution and equity — but underlying all of those is intent,” Nelson said during her opening.
Judges pressed both sides on whether elements of the dispute are legal questions reviewed for correctness or factual findings reviewed for abuse of discretion. Judge Mortensen asked whether the court should defer to district-court findings when the issue turns on traceability and whether the lower court misapplied controlling law. Counsel agreed that some questions (for example, how to apply precedent) are legal, while specific tracing determinations — such as whether funds are “inextricably commingled” — are factual and may require remand for recalculation by the district court.
A core dispute concerned a set of Morgan Stanley accounts that Nelson said contained roughly $1.3 million when the parties married and therefore should be treated as premarital separate property. Nelson argued that if the premarital portion is identifiable, the court should back it out rather than treat the entire balance as marital, and that remand would be required if the appellate court accepted part of that argument. The panel repeatedly probed both the record and competing case law about when a fund retains its separate identity and when it loses that identity by subsequent deposits and withdrawals.
The parties also debated the DJK operating account and how precedent such as Brown should govern one-way flow facts. Nelson argued the trial record lacked testimony supporting certain factual findings (she noted a sworn affidavit that a party had claimed to work 20 hours per week but said that testimony did not come up at trial), and asked the panel to treat some of the district court’s steps as legal error. Respondent counsel Bart Johnson countered that the trial court took judicial notice of inconsistent prior statements in the record and that the court’s factual determinations on tracing and commingling were entitled to deference.
Alimony and housing formed a second major thread. The trial court awarded housing relief intended to allow the respondent to obtain housing “equivalent” to a premarital Park City home; counsel and the bench debated whether the court properly tethered the alimony calculation to a geographic choice that materially increased cost. Nelson called the court’s $8,000 monthly housing figure unsupported by trial evidence and flagged Zillow printouts and down‑payment assumptions as hearsay or absent from the trial record. Johnson said the trial court relied on Tammy’s testimony about social ties and the parties’ standard of living and that awarding housing sufficient to approximate that standard was within the court’s discretion.
Attorney fees were also at issue. The parties discussed a roughly $50,000 pretrial fee award the district court said was not refundable and total fees near $200,000; the panel questioned whether the trial court applied the correct standard related to “need” and whether that standard had been properly resolved during the case.
Throughout argument the bench returned repeatedly to the practical effect of different tracing approaches and to how custody of factual findings should be allocated between the trial and appellate courts. Counsel acknowledged some areas would require remand for factual recalculation if the panel accepted part of their legal challenges.
The court thanked counsel for helpful briefing and argument and said it would issue a decision as soon as possible. The panel then adjourned.

