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Utah Court of Appeals hears challenge to admission of prior convictions in Hunt murder trial; court takes case under advisement

Utah Court of Appeals · October 24, 2024
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Summary

At oral argument in Cedar City, appellant’s lawyer argued that testimony and evidence of prior convictions and prison conduct prejudiced his client’s self-defense claim; the State countered that counsel reasonably used admissible impeachment evidence and the court will issue a written decision.

Cedar City — The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument in Hunt’s appeal over whether defense counsel’s use of the defendant’s prior convictions and prison conduct at trial deprived him of a fair trial, and took the case under advisement for a written decision.

Andrew Fitzgerald, counsel for the appellant, told the three-judge panel that he "had a moment of shock" when he read the record and saw prior bad-act evidence and testimony about the defendant’s decade in the penitentiary come before the jury. Fitzgerald said the defense’s tactic — calling witnesses who testified about the appellant’s good conduct in prison and allowing evidence of prior convictions — "put him in such a poor light that his defense failed right out of the gates," and argued the cumulative effect was so harmful that "it can't be anything but ineffective assistance of counsel." He said the lack of a bifurcation motion and the admission of impeachment material undermined the defendant’s self‑defense case because the jury judged the defendant as a "jailbird" rather than deciding the disputed factual issues.

William Haines, arguing for the state, told the court Hunt "received effective assistance of counsel" and urged the panel to affirm. Haines said once the state had put impeachment evidence before the jury, it was a reasonable strategic decision for defense counsel to use that same evidence to support a justification defense. He cited Rule 609 and precedent such as Ross and State v. Bedell to argue impeachment by prior convictions is admissible and that a Rule 403 balancing is not applied in the same way for impeachment; he also noted the jury returned a split verdict, acquitting Hunt on some counts, as evidence the jury did not convict solely on a propensity theory.

The panel pressed both sides about legal limits and preservation on appeal. One judge asked whether failing to seek bifurcation is always defective; Fitzgerald said it is not always the correct answer but argued bifurcation is often the safer practice and particularly significant given the facts here. Counsel debated whether a prosecutor’s compound question referencing statutory "intent" language improperly usurped the jury’s fact-finding; Fitzgerald said that phrasing risked turning witness testimony into statutory recitation and thereby prejudicing the factfinder, while the state argued the defendant’s own testimony admitting he shot the victim diminished any incremental harm from the question.

Both sides also discussed the mistrial motion. Haines called a mistrial a "dramatic remedy" and argued any error was harmless because (among other points) the defendant himself testified in a manner consistent with the challenged questions and the defense introduced witnesses (father, corrections officer) who rebutted damaging impressions. Fitzgerald said the defense's own tactical decisions should not excuse a result that deprived his client of a fair adjudication.

The court concluded argument by thanking counsel and saying it would "take this matter under advisement and render a written decision as soon as we are able." No ruling was announced from the bench at the close of the session.

Next steps: The Court of Appeals will circulate a written opinion addressing whether trial counsel’s conduct and the contested evidentiary rulings were objectively unreasonable and whether any errors were prejudicial under the applicable ineffective-assistance and evidence-law standards.