Supreme Court hears argument on when a single baseless charge can sustain a Fourth Amendment malicious‑prosecution suit

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court on Tuesday heard oral argument in Chaverini v. City of Napoleon, a case that asks whether a plaintiff may bring a Fourth Amendment malicious‑prosecution claim by proving that at least one charge in an arrest lacked probable cause even when other charges supported detention.

Petitioner’s counsel, Miss Anand, told the justices the parties agree that the ‘‘charge‑specific’’ rule governs the lack‑of‑probable‑cause element and urged the Court to adopt a narrow holding: a plaintiff may make out a malicious‑prosecution claim by showing at least one charged offense lacked probable cause and the case should be remanded for the lower courts to resolve remaining issues. "The plaintiff may make out a malicious prosecution claim by proving that 1 charge is not supported by probable cause even if other charges are," Anand said.

The most contested question at argument was causation: whether the plaintiff must also prove that the baseless charge caused an unreasonable seizure. Chief Justice (questioning) asked whether, if two of three charges were valid and would have justified detention, the plaintiff ‘‘still get[s] relief’’ and whether some counterfactual showing is required. Anand agreed that causation is an element but urged the Court not to adopt novel rules about how to conduct the counterfactual without fuller briefing.

Responding to justices’ hypotheticals, counsel discussed precedent about the 48‑hour Gerstein standard and the Eleventh Circuit formulation that asks whether the detention could have been accomplished as a warrantless arrest. Anand cautioned against a rule that would allow police to insulate misconduct simply by tacking a supported charge onto an otherwise tainted process.

Respondents’ counsel, Miss Wold, told the Court that existing Fourth Amendment precedents require an objective assessment of whether the remaining charges justified detention. Wold argued the petitioner was held for several days pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause for two misdemeanors and that those charges, in her view, objectively justified the detention. "Applying the correct Fourth Amendment rule here means setting aside the charge the petitioner alleges to have lacked probable cause and assessing whether the remaining charges objectively justify his detention," Wold said.

Several justices probed whether locating the claim in the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of an "unreasonable seizure" and whether related doctrines (for example, due process or state‑law malicious‑prosecution remedies) might provide different standards. Justice Gorsuch noted tension between common‑law malicious‑prosecution principles and the Fourth Amendment’s focus on seizures; other justices pressed both sides on practicable evidentiary paths for proving causation on remand, including bail determinations or local rules that make some offenses summonable rather than arrestable.

Both sides urged the Court to resolve the circuit split without reaching broader doctrinal questions. Petitioner asked only to overturn the Sixth Circuit’s approach that treated probable cause for any charged offense as fatal to the claim; respondents urged affirmance, arguing the remaining charges plainly supported the limited detention here. After questioning and a short rebuttal, the Court submitted the case for decision.

The justices are likely to announce whether they will adopt the petitioner’s charge‑specific rule, articulate a causation requirement for seizure‑based Fourth Amendment malicious‑prosecution claims, or narrow the issue and remand for development of facts and further briefing. The case was submitted at the end of oral argument.