Supreme Court hears oral argument in Loperbright v. Raimondo over Chevron deference

The Supreme Court on argument in Loperbright Enterprises v. Raimondo considered whether courts should continue to defer to federal agencies under the Chevron framework or instead undertake de novo statutory interpretation.

Mister Clement, counsel for the petitioners, told the justices that Chevron’s two-step test has produced “reliance-destroying” results and allows agencies to shift heavy costs onto regulated parties. Clement said the case illustrates that agencies required fishermen to carry federal monitors on 50% of trips at costs the petitioners say could amount to as much as 20% of annual returns, while Congress had elsewhere capped industry-funded monitoring fees at 2 percent to 3 percent of the value of the catch. “The Chevron two-step has to go,” Clement said, urging the court to replace it with a single question: “What is the best reading of the statute?”

Several justices pressed Clement on practical consequences. Justice Kagan and others asked whether overruling Chevron would prompt a flood of challenges to decades of agency decisions and whether Skidmore’s persuasiveness standard could meaningfully fill the gap. Clement responded that robust application of statutory canons and de novo review would let courts reach the best reading without surrendering core substantive holdings.

General Prelinger, arguing for the government, replied that petitioners have conceded Congress can expressly delegate interpretive authority to agencies and defended Chevron as a sensible accommodation of Congress’s choice to rely on agency expertise. Prelinger pointed to statutory provisions — including text authorizing monitors, a statutory definition of monitors, penalty provisions, and residual authorities in fishery-management provisions — as bases for the agency’s actions. He urged the Court to clarify and police Chevron’s limits rather than overturn it, proposing a narrower, Kaiser-style refinement to sharpen step 1 analysis and enforce outer bounds at step 2.

The argument ranged over a series of precedents and doctrines including Brand X, Skidmore, Mead, Michigan v. EPA, and the APA’s review provision. Counsel and justices debated whether Chevron’s deference reflects a permissible inference of congressional intent, whether it has produced instability because agencies can “flip flop,” and how courts should treat changed agency positions.

Clement conceded there are statutory contexts that are properly delegated, but he emphasized that ambiguity should not automatically yield deference to agencies: “If you strip away Chevron, this is a fairly easy case where you just say, wow, Congress had this question in mind in one place,” he said, referring to statutory caps in other fisheries. Prelinger countered that the statute at issue contains multiple provisions supporting the agency’s authority and that courts can and should review facts about cost estimates, waivers and exemptions.

After further questioning and a brief rebuttal from Clement reiterating his central points, the Court submitted the case for decision.