SJC hears challenge to long-delayed appeal in Raymond J. White case

BOSTON — The Supreme Judicial Court heard argument on whether Raymond J. White, convicted in 1972 of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, may obtain the benefit of changes in the law after a period in which he lacked a direct appeal.

Defense counsel Catherine Neaves told the court that Mr. White "was convicted of 2 counts of first degree murder more than 53 years ago in 1972 and was sentenced to death" and that successive lawyers failed to perfect his direct appeal, leaving him entitled, she argued, to review under modern standards. Neaves urged the court to exercise its discretion and grant a new trial, stressing Mr. White's advanced age (76, turning 77) and the decades-long procedural lapses.

The core dispute presented was procedural and substantive. The defense argued that because the failure to secure a direct appeal was the product of counsel neglect rather than any deliberate delay by the defendant, Mr. White should benefit from legal developments after his conviction, including review under the court's 33(e)-type standard. A bench question focused on Mr. White's eight-year escape from custody ending in December 1980 and whether that escape should limit retroactivity; Neaves said the record shows the delay in obtaining an appeal began before the escape.

The Commonwealth, represented by Erin Knight, urged the court to affirm. "The defendant doesn't put before you anything to negate his guilt," Knight told the justices, pointing to what she described as physical evidence, eyewitness identifications, ballistics and the defendants' possession of money. Knight argued that, under precedent such as Beauchamp, 1980 is an appropriate demarcation for applying subsequent changes in law where the defendant's conduct contributed to delay, and that any contemporaneous imperfections in jury instructions were not prejudicial on the record.

The justices and counsel debated several trial errors raised on collateral review. Defense counsel pressed that the reasonable-doubt instruction was constitutionally deficient because it lacked saving language and improperly defined reasonable doubt as a doubt "based upon a reason," which, she said, risks shifting the burden to the defendant. The Commonwealth responded that the instruction conformed with prevailing practice at the time and that similar instructions had been affirmed in this court's prior decisions.

Witness identification and the trial setting were also heavily discussed. Counsel reviewed eyewitness testimony—one store manager said he recognized White from a side view, another witness worked outside the store and described seeing the holdup—and the defense questioned whether those identifications were so overwhelming that any instructional error could be deemed harmless. The record also reflects discussion about defendants' placement in a courtroom "dock," a practice the court acknowledged was used historically and later made prospective; the Commonwealth said there was no showing that the dock prevented Mr. White from consulting counsel or participating in his defense.

The bench asked for some record supplementation after defense counsel said she had an "abbreviated file" and could not find verdict slips; counsel offered to supply them if they exist. Both sides acknowledged the case raises difficult procedural questions about retroactivity and the proper standard for reviewing decades-old convictions on collateral attack.

The argument concluded with the Commonwealth urging the court to consider the totality of the evidence and deny relief, and the defense asking for a new trial in light of the cumulative procedural failures and what it called constitutionally flawed instructions. The justices did not announce a decision at the hearing.