Chairman Wicker opened a December hearing marking the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords by recalling the human toll the agreement ended: “More than 100,000 people died, and 2,000,000 more were displaced,” and asking witnesses to assess Dayton’s legacy and lessons for today.

Dr. Christopher Chivas, a former U.S. national intelligence officer for Europe, told the Commission that Dayton was “one of the great diplomatic achievements of the post–Cold War period” because it ended the violence, but that the United States can no longer assume the same level of unilateral power it had in the 1990s. “There is no way to return to a 1990s‑style U.S. interventionism in the Balkans,” Chivas said, arguing that Washington should support a pragmatic, European‑led strategy while offering diplomatic, technical and development assistance.

Ambassador Clint Williamson, who described his role as presiding arbiter for the arbitration created under Dayton, highlighted the Brčko District as an example of a U.S.-backed enforcement mechanism that helped create a functioning multiethnic community. Williamson said the arbitration process and a U.S.‑headed supervisory office “have very much been an American project” that deterred interference and helped Brčko become a rare instance of integrated schools and shared civic institutions.

Dr. Paul Williams, who served as a pro bono member of the Bosnian delegation at Dayton, emphasized that the agreement was negotiated under “moral compromise, extreme coercion, and the urgent need” to deploy protection forces. “Dayton succeeded in ending the war,” Williams said, “but it was never designed to create a framework for governing Bosnia and Herzegovina in the long term.” He warned against repeating that approach in future peace processes.

Witnesses underscored common problems that followed Dayton: constitutional provisions that allocate political power by ethnicity, electoral rules the European Court of Human Rights has found incompatible with democratic principles, endemic corruption, political patronage and population decline. As Chivas noted, the constitutional design “functions more like a straight jacket” that constrains the country’s political development.

On practical next steps, witnesses recommended a mix of measures: support for EU accession processes that impose rule‑of‑law benchmarks, continued backing for institutions tied to Dayton’s enforcement (including the Brčko arbitration and the office of the High Representative), and expanded U.S. technical and development financing to provide alternatives to Russian and Chinese influence. Chivas urged using tools such as the Development Finance Corporation to offer local leaders financing options that do not come with malign strings attached.

The witnesses also cautioned that reforms require political incentives: if EU membership feels decades away, local political leaders lack motivation to pursue difficult reforms such as pension reform or anti‑corruption measures. That dynamic, they said, helps explain why corruption remains ‘‘endemic’’ and why rule‑of‑law reform through the EU accession process (chapter 23 benchmarks) remains crucial.

The panel closed by stressing that Dayton’s primary success—ending mass violence—should be weighed against its structural limitations, and that any future peace planning (including work related to Ukraine) should avoid embedding ethnic divisions in permanent governance structures. The Commission thanked the witnesses and adjourned without further action.

Ending note: The hearing offered policy options rather than formal decisions; commissioners and witnesses urged follow‑up through diplomatic coordination, support for EU accession incentives and continued U.S. engagement with Bosnia’s rule‑of‑law institutions.