House Science Committee Hearing Flags Progress and Gaps in Research‑security Implementation
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Witnesses from NSF, NASA, NIH and DOE described steps to implement NSPM 33 and the CHIPS and Science Act — including training, common disclosure forms and a trust framework — while members pressed agencies on staffing, funding caps and a pending NSF review of NCAR.
Today’s hearing before the Science, Space, and Technology subcommittee reviewed how federal agencies are implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 and the research-security provisions of the CHIPS and Science Act.
The chair opened the session by framing research security as a bipartisan national‑security priority and urging institutions that receive federal research funds to disclose foreign affiliations and protect sensitive data. "Keep America's research secure, protect taxpayers' investments," the chair said, describing the memorandum and statute as core tools for that work.
Why it matters: Committee members said prompt, uniform implementation is critical to preventing foreign exploitation of U.S. research while maintaining openness that attracts talent and drives innovation.
Key witness summaries follow. Dr. Rebecca Kaiser, acting chief of research security strategy and policy at the National Science Foundation, said NSF has implemented training, a three‑phase trust framework and a secure center for analytics to help institutions identify risks. "Researchers must also now certify that they have taken research security training to qualify to apply for NSF funding," Kaiser said.
Dr. Daniel Evans, NASA’s assistant deputy associate administrator for research, described a three‑pronged approach of "integrity, clarity, and alignment," including a statutory firewall and a dual‑layer verification process to confirm that funded researchers are free from participation in malign foreign talent‑recruitment programs.
Dr. Patricia Valdez, NIH’s chief extramural research integrity officer, said NIH has shifted some foreign collaborations from subawards to direct subprojects to improve oversight and reported that NIH’s Office of Extramural Research has handled nearly 700 allegations in recent years; she also said civil and administrative recoveries have totaled about $37.8 million in escalated cases.
Jay Tilden, DOE director of counterintelligence and intelligence, described DOE’s managed‑research model at national laboratories, a science‑and‑technology risk matrix that can allow, constrain or prohibit foreign‑national participation depending on the field, and recommendations for tailored, risk‑based mitigation and stronger federal analytic capabilities.
Points of friction during questioning included NSF staffing levels required by statute, whether delays increased risk, and the capacity of smaller institutions to comply if indirect‑cost reimbursements are capped. In a focused Q&A, Ranking Member Representative Sykes pressed Dr. Kaiser on whether NSF’s research‑security office met the CHIPS‑act staffing requirement. Kaiser said NSF currently has the chief plus three additional personnel and is hiring to bolster capacity.
Committee members also raised a recent NSF review of large facilities, and Representative Von Ameche asked about a notice about the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Dr. Kaiser said NSF was assessing large facilities and would solicit community input and had not announced an intent to restructure NCAR.
What’s next: The committee left the record open for 10 days for additional comments and written questions. Members signaled continued oversight interest in staffing, harmonization of disclosure forms, funding to support compliance at smaller institutions, and improved interagency information‑sharing protocols.
Ending: The subcommittee adjourned after members and witnesses affirmed the need to protect taxpayer‑funded research while maintaining the openness that underpins U.S. science and innovation.
