Appellate panel hears Hollingsworth’s challenge to 22-year delay, notice and sentence after probation revocation

At an appellate oral argument, Joshua Lade, an appellate public defender for Tommy Hollingsworth, told the court that the key problems in his client’s revocation are a 22-year delay tied to an unfiled detainer, lack of notice that absconsion would be relied on, and an excessive revocation sentence. “The cause of the delay in this case was the state's failure to file a detainer on Mister Hollingsworth's account in NCIC,” Lade said, arguing that a properly filed detainer would have flagged the matter when Mr. Hollingsworth faced later trouble in other jurisdictions.

Lade summarized the underlying facts: Hollingsworth was placed on probation on Oct. 19, 1998; a violation warrant issued in 2002 and, aside from that warrant, the record remained dormant until December 2024 when he was returned to Tennessee and his probation was revoked in March. Lade asked the court to assume a 22‑year delay for purposes of argument and said that, under the Barker speedy‑trial factors, the delay and the state’s unexplained absence of a detainer weigh in the defendant’s favor.

The defense also raised a plain‑error due‑process claim centered on notice. Lade told the judges that the 2002 warrant alleged four violations that would now be considered technical, and that the record contains no written or actual notice that absconsion was a basis for revocation. He argued that without notice, and without absconsion, the trial court lacked authority to revoke probation for a first instance of technical violations under the statute cited in argument.

Regarding sentencing, Lade said the original judgment imposed two consecutive three‑year terms, the warrant issued after one term had expired, and the trial court’s revocation sentence of six years exceeded the authority that applied to the remaining term. He also noted Mr. Hollingsworth is currently in custody and scheduled for parole consideration in the near term, a circumstance he said could affect immediate relief while broader legal questions are resolved.

Benjamin Barker, arguing for the state, urged the court to affirm the trial court’s revocation. Barker said the speedy‑trial clock began at arrest in the state’s view, and listed the four violations underlying the revocation—failure to pay supervision fees, unpaid court costs, a failed drug test in June 2002, and quitting employment in May 2002—contending those separate instances justified full revocation. “At base, defendant committed 4 instances of technical violations, which was sufficient to fully revoke his probation,” Barker said, and he argued any reliance on absconsion was harmless in light of those violations and binding precedent the state cited.

Counsel and the panel debated precedent and statutory interpretation. Defense counsel criticized the state precedent relied on by the trial court as unpersuasive and urged a textual reading that would treat a first revocation proceeding as protecting defendants from full revocation for purely technical violations—Lade argued the statutory maximum without absconsion for a first technical instance was 15 days. The bench asked questions about changes in the law since 2002 and how the technical/nontechnical distinction should be applied retroactively.

The panel did not issue a decision at argument. The court took the matter under advisement and recessed to change panels; counsel were told the court will consider the briefs and the argument before issuing a ruling.