The Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument in Commonwealth v. Sambath Chang over whether the defendant adequately showed he faces the prospect of deportation as a result of admitting to sufficient facts, and whether that prospect is established either by prior steps taken against him or by an express written federal policy.

Edward Crane, defense counsel, told the justices the case rests on Granham's two pathways for showing a deportation risk: either the federal government has taken a step toward deporting the defendant, or there exists an express written federal policy calling for initiation of deportation proceedings. Crane introduced an executive order, dated 01/20/2025, titled "protecting the American people against invasion," and read key language from the order, arguing that "it is the policy of The United States to faithfully execute the immigration laws" and that the order expresses a written policy to remove "all removable aliens with criminal convictions." He said that, under the order, an admission to sufficient facts renders his client removable and therefore the order satisfies the Granham express-written-policy standard.

The exchange included extensive questioning from the bench about how to treat an "admission to sufficient facts" as compared with a conviction for immigration purposes. An unidentified justice asked whether the executive order nonetheless leaves enforcement discretion to immigration officials and how that discretion affects the Granham test. Crane acknowledged some enforcement discretion exists in practice but argued the order eliminates categorical exemptions and signals an intent to remove all removable noncitizens, which meaningfully increases the practical risk defendants face.

Cohen for the Commonwealth urged the court to affirm the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea. Jennifer Cohen acknowledged the statutorily required 29(d) warning omitted explicit reference to an "admission to sufficient facts" but argued that, "in conjunction" with the Rule 12/B warnings, the totality of the warnings conveyed the appropriate message about immigration consequences and therefore the warning scheme sufficed. She also told the court that the proceedings in this defendant's case had been dismissed and that the lack of reinitiation of removal proceedings was relevant to whether the defendant currently faces a non-hypothetical risk of deportation.

A justice asked counsel to address an amici contention that technological and enforcement changes (for example, broader biometric data-sharing and automated notifications) have increased the practical risk of deportation since Granham was decided, making the "hypothetical" risk less theoretical. Cohen warned that a broad rule could sweep in many defendants whose old pleas lack a complete record, producing retroactivity and evidentiary problems for convictions or pleas from decades past.

The advocates also debated controlling precedents. Crane relied on Commonwealth v. Heller to underline that a written "green sheet" or paperwork cannot substitute for an adequate oral warning from the judge: "The warning itself has to come from the judge," he said. Both lawyers rested on their briefs and concluded argument; the transcript contains no ruling.

The court heard extended argument on (1) whether prior steps taken against this defendant (including a notice to appear and a decade-long history in immigration court) satisfy Granham's "some step" standard; (2) whether the January 20, 2025 executive order qualifies as an "express written policy" under Granham despite the prospect of retained enforcement discretion; and (3) whether the combination of the 29(d) and Rule 12 warnings in this record sufficiently informed the defendant of immigration consequences following an admission to sufficient facts.

The argument closed with both counsel resting on their briefs. The justices did not announce a decision within the portion of the transcript provided.