Subcommittee raises undersea cable vulnerability as part of multi‑domain cyber resilience discussion

Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection · January 13, 2026

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Summary

Members pressed witnesses on risks to undersea cables and repair/resilience capabilities; experts urged multi‑domain responses involving the U.S. Navy, private owners, more repair ships, and better intelligence and redundancy planning.

Rep. Littrell told the panel that more than 90% of global information flows over undersea cables and asked which departments and private operators are responsible for protecting and repairing that infrastructure.

Witnesses said the risk is multi‑domain: attacks or damage have both physical and cyber components and responses must draw on the U.S. Navy, law enforcement, network operators, and the private companies that own most cables. Emily Harding offered to share staff research on undersea cable legal and prosecution options and recommended increasing repair capacity and using AI to monitor anomalous vessel behavior near cable routes.

Members asked whether redundancy is sufficient and whether legal and operational responsibility is clearly assigned inside the government; witnesses said there is no single 'good home' for undersea cable issues in the federal government and urged congressional attention to incentivize private investment, grow repair capacity, and improve interagency coordination.