Appeals court probes when a suspended sentence becomes probation
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Summary
In Commonwealth v. Elijah Finch, defense counsel argued a defendant lacked notice that probation had begun because a signed order and timing were unclear; the Commonwealth said the sentence took effect when pronounced and pointed to the plea colloquy and clerk's entry.
The appeals panel heard argument in Commonwealth v. Elijah Finch over whether the trial court erred in finding Finch violated probation when the timing and terms of his probation were disputed.
Appellant counsel Ashley McCormick argued the record did not establish a full and effective probation order at 12:59 p.m. on the day the alleged violation occurred. McCormick emphasized there was no signed or time‑stamped order in evidence before the violation judge and that standard conditions and special conditions were not orally articulated in the pre‑trial colloquy; she urged the court to require more explicit, written evidence that probation had been imposed.
Assistant District Attorney Melissa Johnson replied that sentences are effective when imposed and that the clerk's pronouncement and plea colloquy, together with the defendant’s sworn statements about having discussed the green sheet with counsel, supported a finding that the suspended sentence — and the probationary terms — were in effect when pronounced. She cited procedural authorities referenced in argument (rule 31, "2 79 section 4") to support the Commonwealth's position.
The panel questioned whether the issue is judged by preponderance and how to weigh the existence of two separate probation orders, docket irregularities, and whether an acquittal at the bench trial would change the analysis. The court submitted the matter after oral argument.