Broadwater County meeting addresses keypad access after commissioners entered other offices

Speaker 3 (identified in the transcript only by the speaker label) opened a Jan. 7 Broadwater County meeting to address recent changes to office door keypads, saying the meeting’s goal was a constructive discussion after a commissioner used a code to enter the treasurer’s office and ‘‘I am sorry that my actions have caused a stir.’’

Why it matters: the conversation centered on elections-office security and personally identifiable information held in certain offices, where commissioners’ ability to enter with a code raised concerns about ballot integrity, after-hours access and compliance with statutes cited in the meeting. Staff described layered protections in the elections office—vaults, locked inner doors, cameras and locked cabinets—that they say make unrestricted after-hours access risky.

At the meeting, several elected officials and department heads disagreed over how the keypad rollout was communicated. Speakers who supported the change said the intention was to replicate prior key access ("whatever your key got you into, the ... pin would go into"), and that the upgrades were paid for with PILP funds after a homeland security grant fell through. Others objected that the deadbolt on at least one office had been removed without prior notice and that the commissioners were not consulted. Speaker 4 said she was surprised to find the deadbolt gone and was not informed before the work occurred.

The elections administrator (Speaker 6) framed the concern in legal and operational terms: she said statutes governing elections focus on protecting ballots and processes and warned that broad commissioner access increases risk. During the exchange she stated, "I do believe that it is against the law," citing the need to limit who can access ballot-related materials and sensitive records.

Speakers also pointed to a recent example used to illustrate risk: Speaker 9 described an incident that weekend in which a new resident tried codes and "it just so happened to be an employee's code that worked," underscoring how having many active PINs raises the chance of unauthorized entry. That example prompted discussion of technical solutions, including returning programmable fobs and limiting active PINs.

Cost and procurement were unresolved. Participants proposed issuing fobs for judges and designated staff to reduce PIN-guessing; however, there were inconsistent price statements in the meeting (one speaker said, "They're $45 a piece," another said $10), leaving per-unit cost and funding arrangements to be clarified.

On operational steps, participants agreed on several practical directions: maintenance should only enter sensitive offices during business hours or when an authorized staff member is present; department heads will provide maintenance a list of authorized personnel; the county will draft and circulate written access procedures for each elected office; and the sheriff’s office would retain emergency access where needed. Speaker 3 said the commissioners will ask department heads to submit short written policies describing public and staff expectations under the new system.

No formal motion or vote was taken. The meeting closed with participants agreeing to improve direct communication—phone or in-person—before sending broad emails about sensitive internal matters, and to produce written access policies and maintenance guidelines.

The next steps are procedural rather than legislative: department heads will tell maintenance who is authorized, maintenance will follow the written rules (including not entering sensitive offices when no staff are present), and county officials will consider fobs or reinstallation of internal deadbolts for after-hours security with sheriff access. The group did not set a firm deadline for the written policies at the meeting.