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Missouri committee hears divided views on HB 2699, which would bar parole for judicial tampering
Summary
House Bill 2699 would classify tampering with judicial officers or proceedings as a Class D felony and make persons convicted under the provision ineligible for parole, probation, or conditional release. Sponsors and judicial groups said stronger protections are needed; public advocates and some members warned the parole ban may be too severe and urged preserving judicial discretion.
Representative David Dolan (District 148) told the House Judiciary Committee that House Bill 2699 would add a provision making persons convicted under specified tampering offenses ineligible for parole, probation or conditional release and would treat tampering with judicial proceedings as a Class D felony.
"No person convicted under this subsection or subsection 1 shall be eligible for parole, probation or conditional release," Dolan said, describing the proposed changes and saying the conduct undermines public trust in courts. He recounted a personal incident in which he said the FBI warned him of a credible threat after a social-media post showed him threatened with violence.
Supporters included Eric Jennings, counsel for the Judicial Conference of Missouri, and David Clarich for the Missouri Circuit Judges Association. Jennings said sponsors had narrowed the bill’s scope and sought alignment with existing witness-tampering language; Clarich said the association supports protecting courtroom personnel but urged specific, fact-based drafting that preserves judicial discretion.
Opponents included Arnie C. Acdinos, state public advocate, and court clerks and staff who described the proposal as duplicative of existing remedies or unduly harsh. Acdinos said the parole prohibition could functionally amount to life detention in some cases; Representative Smith corrected that the bill as drafted makes tampering a Class D felony, which carries a maximum of seven years, and therefore is not a life sentence.
Committee members raised several alternative approaches. Representative Veed asked whether the statute could allow a judge to specify a period of parole/probation ineligibility (for example, up to five years) rather than impose a blanket ban, arguing that one-time, emotionally charged conduct in domestic cases may warrant individualized judicial assessment. Witnesses and advocates said judges’ discretion and fact-driven sentencing parameters would be appropriate topics for further drafting.
No committee vote was recorded; witnesses and members said they would continue to refine statutory language on definitions (including whether to explicitly protect public defenders, clerks and court reporters) and on the scope of parole ineligibility.
