Court hears appeal over DPS firing tied to officer’s PTSD and fitness‑for‑duty

Supreme Court of Texas · January 16, 2026

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Summary

In No. 240966, the court heard argument over whether the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully removed Special Agent Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s school, or whether the department’s actions constituted disability discrimination under Chapter 21 by acting on a prediction of future risk tied to a PTSD diagnosis.

The Supreme Court of Texas considered whether the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully removed a special agent from his position after a school incident involving his daughter, or whether that removal amounted to disability discrimination under Chapter 21. Speaker 2 described the removal as based on DPS supervisors’ assessment of the officer’s mental fitness and future risk, while counsel for the appellee argued those statements were direct evidence of discriminatory intent.

Why it matters: the appeal turns on whether employer decisions based on mental‑health diagnoses are permissible when the employer reasonably concludes an officer poses a safety risk, or whether reliance on such diagnoses without objective specialist input crosses into unlawful discrimination.

Speaker 2 summarized the record: Lieutenant Rocco and Director McGraw made statements about the officer’s emotional control and mental capacity, and DPS removed the agent not for his past performance but because supervisors concluded he might be a risk in the future. Counsel for the employee stressed that the record contains a documented PTSD diagnosis (and prior FMLA leave) and argued the department relied on unqualified subjective judgments rather than objective medical assessment.

Justices questioned who should decide whether an employee is "qualified" for essential job functions and what the statutory framework requires. The court discussed the statutory predicate for Chapter 21 claims and the intersection with fitness‑for‑duty procedures and direct‑threat arguments. Counsel for the employee pointed to absence of produced DPS fitness‑for‑duty policy in discovery and said that had the policy been in the record, it would have been part of the trial evidence.

The argument probed whether supervisors' stated concerns were pretextual; Speaker 1 highlighted inconsistencies in deposition and suspension/termination decisions and asked whether those articulations were genuine reasons or pretext for discrimination. Speaker 2 emphasized the department’s responsibility to protect the public and referenced circumstances the agency relied upon in changing discipline from suspension to termination.

The court did not announce a decision at argument. The justices signaled an inquiry focused on statutory standards for qualification, the sufficiency of objective evidence relied on by the employer, and whether the department followed its own procedures in making the disciplinary decision.