Supreme Court hears dispute over roofer’s fall, control of site and excluded intoxication evidence
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Summary
In No. 240846, counsel debated whether a roofer’s fall from the edge of a two‑story apartment roof is governed by premises‑liability law or a negligent‑activity theory, whether JMI exercised control that required fall protection, and whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence the worker consumed alcohol and marijuana hours earlier.
The Supreme Court of Texas heard competing views on whether liability in No. 240846, JNI Contractors v. Medihe, should rest on a premises‑defect theory or on a negligent‑activity theory tied to the contractor’s contemporaneous direction of work. Speaker 2, arguing for the party defending the jury verdict, told the court that the central evidence is the roof’s unguarded edge and testimony that JMI supervisors directed the worker to pull slippery TPO membrane toward that edge.
Why it matters: the classification—premises defect versus negligent activity—affects what duty, if any, the property occupier owed and which parties may be responsible. Speaker 1 repeatedly pressed counsel about where courts draw the line between an existing dangerous condition and a new, dangerous act that imposes a different legal standard.
Speaker 2 said the jury’s findings on control are dispositive: "The jury answered the question that JMI exercised control for the use of fall protection," and that control, combined with instructions to work near the edge, supports a negligent‑activity theory rather than a pure premises rule. Counsel pointed to record testimony identifying Raul Rodriguez as a JMI supervisor who directed the work and noted the worker was asked to handle TPO material he had not used before.
Counsel and justices also debated feasible safety measures. Justices asked whether physical guards or a ‘‘watch person’’ could have prevented the fall; counsel acknowledged evidence in the record that a watch or fall protection was practicable and that JMI’s own safety guidance said fall protection was required when workers were within six feet of the roof edge.
A separate, contested issue was exclusion of evidence that the decedent had consumed alcohol and marijuana several hours before the fall. Speaker 2 defended the trial court’s exclusion as within discretion absent expert proof that consumption causally impaired the worker at the time of the accident, arguing courts should not adopt a blanket rule admitting allegations of prior consumption. Justice questioning noted medical‑record entries and elapsed time ("five to six hours") that bear on relevance; the court discussed whether lay testimony about smell and lay statements of use could properly reach the jury.
The justices also explored whether references to immigration status in trial argument rose to incurable jury argument. Counsel said mention of immigration and related remarks were uninvited and risked prejudicial appeal; the court questioned preservation of objection and whether any error was harmless in light of the full record and the jury’s answers on proportionate responsibility.
The argument centered on fact‑intensive questions the court often resolves: (1) whether control over site operations and direction to do an unusual task created a duty to make the work safe; (2) whether excluded evidence about earlier consumption was properly excluded as prejudicial absent causal proof; and (3) whether any improper jury argument warrants reversal. The court’s questioning emphasized the record evidence on control, the nature of the roof surface and the worker’s experience with TPO material, and the timing and content of the excluded evidence.
The court heard extended exchange but did not announce a decision from the bench. Further proceedings will await the court’s written disposition.
