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Representatives and land trusts seek higher conservation tax‑credit caps, refundability to preserve farmland and water rights
Summary
Representative McQueen and conservation partners proposed updating the Land Conservation Incentives Act: raise per‑transaction cap from $250,000 to $2 million, increase qualifying percentage from 50% to 80%, and add refundability to increase landowner payout (~18%); committee members sought limits, program caps, and safeguards for water rights and potential abuses.
Representative McQueen and two conservation partners briefed the committee on proposed changes to the Land Conservation Incentives Act, a voluntary tax‑credit program used to finance conservation easements that keep land in private ownership while protecting wildlife habitat, agricultural production and water rights.
Jonathan Hayden of the New Mexico Land Conservancy and Cecilia Rosacker of the Rio Grande Agricultural Land Trust said the current program has protected more than 500,000 acres since its inception but is increasingly strained as land and water values rise. Hayden said caps set when the program began in 2007 no longer reflect current markets; Rosacker said some landowners are “land rich, cash poor” and need stronger incentives to preserve working lands.
The bill presented would raise the per‑transaction cap from $250,000 to $2,000,000, increase the qualifying percentage of conservation value from 50% to 80%, and add refundability rather than only transferability; proponents said refundability would increase the payout to participating landowners by about 18% because owners would not need to sell credits at a discount to brokers.
Committee members asked follow‑up questions about average credit size (LFC staff said current average credits are in the high‑$200,000 range, constrained by the cap), whether an overall program cap should be added, and how the program handles water rights and enforcement. Representative Duncan raised concerns that high caps could let purchasers buy land and effectively have the easement pay the purchase price; presenters replied that conservation valuation and remaining residual value make a full purchase‑for‑profit strategy unlikely and suggested programmatic safeguards.
Proponents suggested several implementation refinements: indexing caps to inflation, considering a program cap or project caps, and maintaining or expanding selection criteria administered by the energy, minerals and natural resources department to prioritize water‑secure, high‑value conservation projects.
No vote was taken; proponents and several committee members requested follow‑up conversations about program mechanics, potential statutory guardrails, and a fiscal analysis if the cap change is pursued.
