SJC hears argument on whether chapter 214 §1(c) allows harassment suits against individual educators

The Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument in David n Sabatini v. Kristen a Nous and others on whether chapter 214 §1(c) permits claims for sexual harassment in an educational context to be brought against individuals as well as institutions.

Attorney Zucker, arguing for the petitioner, told the court, "There is no such limitation in the statute," urging the justices not to read an individual‑liability bar into §1(c). Zucker pointed to the 1986 enactment that added §1(c) and contemporaneous amendments to related statutes, saying the act adopted harassment definitions without importing the institutional‑only "unfair practices" language found elsewhere.

Zucker said the provision serves a gap‑filling role similar to other parts of the discrimination scheme, citing this court's prior decisions addressing remedial statutes. He underscored the factual context of the case, describing the Whitehead Fellows training program and stating that David Sabatini "had *** with her while she was a student registered at MIT" and that the conduct "continued" in ways the woman found uncomfortable. Zucker argued that in hierarchical scientific training environments, individual remedies matter when supervisors or prominent faculty can silence or derail trainees, and he pointed to a 2018 National Academies consensus referenced in briefing and adopted in NIH guidance.

Attorney Foy, for the opposing side, urged a different reading. "Chapter 151B and 151C are part of a comprehensive remedial set of statutes, and chapter 214 has been consistently held is not an escape hatch from the requirements of 151B," Foy said, arguing that the statutory scheme should be read together and that prior federal decisions and several district judges uniformly limited individual liability under §1(c).

Justices pressed both counsel on textual and practical questions. One justice observed that 151B already provides for individual liability in employment contexts and asked what distinct work §1(c) performs; counsel debated whether §1(c) is coterminous with chapter 151C or instead reaches additional claims that chapter 151 statutes do not cover. The bench focused on the final sentence of §1(c) — which directs that claims actionable under chapter 151B or 151C must generally be filed with the administrative agency (MCAD) first — and asked whether that language implies that §1(c) also reaches claims outside the chapter 151 framework.

Counsel and the court also discussed the practical consequences of recognizing individual liability under §1(c), including whether such a ruling would open the door to student‑on‑student suits or counterclaims and the need for limiting principles if individuals can be sued directly under the equity provision.

Argument concluded after extended questioning; the court did not announce a decision from the bench.