Senate panel hears divided testimony on S.297 to let towns pilot electronic ballot return

The Senate Committee on Government Operations heard testimony Feb. 10 on S.297, a bill that would permit municipalities to adopt an "electronic ballot return" system for Australian‑ballot local elections if they choose. Witnesses disagreed sharply over whether the measure would improve access or introduce unacceptable cyber‑risks.

Sponsor and purpose: Senator Hesham Rob Hinsdale introduced the bill as a narrowly tailored, municipal opt‑in approach designed to expand access for voters who face barriers — including people with disabilities, military and overseas voters, and those affected by unreliable mail service. Hinsdale told the committee the bill is intended to preserve a paper record while letting towns pilot electronic return options and begin conversations about appropriate safeguards.

What the bill says: Tucker Anderson, legislative counsel, told the committee S.297 adds a new section to Title 17 to define "electronic ballot return" and a "qualified electronic transmission system". Anderson said municipalities that adopt the system at a properly warned annual or special meeting could send and receive ballots via a qualified system, but that ballots received electronically must be transcribed by the municipal clerk to anonymous paper ballots and handled under existing ballot‑storage rules. The bill also directs the Secretary of State to publish guidance recommending minimum security, privacy and auditability standards. (Testimony cited the Public Records Act and the Administrative Procedures Act in explaining confidentiality and guidance authority.)

Supporters' case: Forrest Senti of the Mobile Voting Project, who identified a background in defense and cybersecurity and described several pilots and third‑party audits, said the technology has matured and that pilots show higher turnout and improved access. He described the voter flow: download an app, verify identity via multi‑/dual‑factor authentication, mark and submit the ballot (which is encrypted and anonymized), and receive a tracking code; officials would then decrypt offline, print and mix the paper transcription into the tabulation stream so the clerk’s audit procedures remain unchanged. "Every single mobile vote ends up as a paper ballot and is processed through existing tabulation equipment," Senti said. He also said, on a personal level, vendors should not be allowed to sell voter data and offered to provide language to that effect.

Election administrator view: Jocelyn Vaccaro, speaking from experience piloting mobile voting in Denver and advising the Mobile Voting Foundation, told the committee pilots increased participation among the groups the bill targets and that end‑to‑end verifiable systems can enable public auditing. "A system that enables end to end verifiability actually removes that sort of blind trust," Vaccaro said, arguing that verifiability combined with preserved paper records can increase transparency and voter confidence.

Opposition and security concerns: John Odom, city clerk of Montpelier, testified he was speaking for municipal clerks who are wary of the proposal’s operational and security implications. Odom said a Vermont Municipal Clerks and Treasurers Association survey (he said roughly 138 respondents) showed about 82% opposed mobile voting as presented. Odom, who described himself as a certified ethical hacker, warned that malware, "smishing" and large‑scale targeting of mobile numbers could alter votes or compromise identities; he urged the committee to hear town clerks and security experts before advancing the bill. "We're not ready for it," Odom said of broad deployment.

Security debate in committee: Committee members cited recent expert critiques (the testimony referenced a CITP article arguing Internet voting is insecure) and sought clarification about whether the Secretary of State’s previous stance had changed. Supporters acknowledged unresolved risks, saying no system is 100% secure, but argued that end‑to‑end verifiability, dual‑factor authentication and mandatory paper transcriptions substantially mitigate attack vectors and that vendors should be required to demonstrate compliance with the bill’s security requirements.

Next steps: Committee members asked for further testimony — specifically from town clerks and independent security experts — before considering changes to the bill. The chair said additional witnesses, including municipal administrators and disability advocates, were scheduled for the next day; no motion or vote on S.297 was taken at the Feb. 10 meeting.

Ending: The committee adjourned until its next scheduled session with the expectation of additional technical testimony and town‑level perspectives.