Senate Commerce panel: NTSB says ADS‑B in/out could have prevented DCA mid‑air collision; senators push Rotor Act

At a Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee hearing, National Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy testified that the January mid‑air collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport that killed 67 people was "100% preventable" and that broader adoption of ADS‑B in and out would have given pilots actionable alerts nearly a minute before impact.

Homendy, presenting the board's final investigation and a simulation of the collision, told senators the helicopter crew would have received an oral alert about 48 seconds before the crash and the CRJ would have received an alert at about 59 seconds if both aircraft had ADS‑B in/out capability. "Had the Blackhawk and Bombardier CRJ been equipped to receive ADS‑B location signals on 01/29/2025, the pilots would have been warned of each other's exact position nearly one minute before impact," she said.

The NTSB chair emphasized that the board has repeatedly recommended ADS‑B in for decades and that the technology is available and affordable for many operators. In response to cost objections, Homendy said some general aviation setups can use receivers integrated with existing devices for roughly "$400," while commercial retrofits can be more expensive: she cited American Airlines' retrofits at under $50,000 per aircraft as an industry example.

Senators used the hearing to press several themes the NTSB report raised: chronic FAA failures to define and act on "close‑proximity" event data (the NTSB identified roughly 15,214 close‑proximity events in FAA data), weak or absent Safety Management System (SMS) follow‑through, and poor FAA‑DOD coordination. Ranking Member Maria Cantwell and Senator Tammy Duckworth, among others, described repeated warnings from air traffic controllers that were not elevated within FAA or to military partners and urged stronger oversight and data‑sharing requirements.

Committee members pointed to immediate fixes implemented after the crash: Homendy said the secretary of transportation moved quickly on several urgent recommendations, including an interim prohibition on mixed traffic through a specific corridor near Haines Point and requirements for ADS‑B out in that airspace, and authorized additional tower staffing. But she told senators those steps are insufficient without systemic changes to FAA processes and rulemaking to require ADS‑B in where ADS‑B out already exists.

Several senators cited the bipartisan Rotor Act — which the committee passed unanimously and that requires ADS‑B in and out in congested airspace — as a legislative vehicle to enact the NTSB's central recommendation. Homendy told the committee she believed the Rotor Act "wouldn't have occurred" if it had been law at the time of the accident, and she urged the House to take it up promptly.

Lawmakers also raised recent operational confusion in El Paso and other examples that they say show ongoing FAA‑DOD communication gaps. Homendy confirmed systemic coordination problems and noted that some hotline or direct‑line communications between the Pentagon and DCA had been inoperable, saying those operational failures remain under investigation.

The committee set a deadline for senators to submit follow‑up questions for the record (close of business Feb. 19) and for witnesses to respond (March 5). The hearing closed with broad bipartisan calls for swift legislative and administrative action to implement the NTSB's 50 safety recommendations arising from the investigation.

The committee adjourned following these remarks and the Q&A.