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Committee briefing reviews Gannon rulings and history of Kansas school‑finance litigation, including special‑education funding
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Summary
Staff reviewed Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution and the seven Gannon decisions that defined equity and adequacy in school finance; members asked how the courts treat special‑education reimbursement (the 92% excess‑cost figure) and about litigation costs and federal funding roles.
Committee staff gave a detailed briefing on Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution and the Gannon litigation that has shaped school‑finance policy in Kansas, then answered member questions about special‑education funding and the state's obligations.
Nick, a committee staff member, began with Article 6’s structure: the state constitution names education as a legislative responsibility, establishes a State Board of Education with "general supervision" (a self‑executing authority in some domains) and leaves local boards under statutory rules. "Article 6, section 1, that schools and related institutions... the legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational, and scientific improvement," he said.
He reviewed several court decisions that interpret the balance among the legislature, the State Board of Education and local boards. Using Peabody and other cases, staff explained that the State Board can in some instances exercise supervisory authority without a statute, but the legislature retains power to adopt laws that are "in harmony with and not in derogation of" the constitution.
The briefing then covered the Gannon cases (Gannon 1–7). Nick summarized Gannon 1 as establishing the test that "suitable provision for finance" requires both equity and adequacy. Later rulings split the analytical work—Gannon 2–3 focused on equity issues, Gannon 4 elaborated on adequacy and found that the CLASS Act block grants were structurally deficient because they were temporary and not responsive to changing enrollment and conditions. The legislature subsequently adopted a weighted student finance formula (KESA/KISA) and phased inflation adjustments (the Montoya Safe Harbor plan); the court ultimately found the legislature had substantially complied and dismissed active jurisdiction in early 2024, though one justice dissented.
Nick explained the court’s two‑part adequacy test: inputs (funding levels, sources and implementation) and outputs (state assessment results, NAEP, ACT, graduation rates and subgroup outcomes). "All sources of funding should be considered," he said, including federal and locally raised funds, and the court gave weight to evidence that reduced funding led to program and service cuts affecting student outcomes.
Lawmakers pressed on interpretation flexibility and special education. Representative Moy asked whether definitions of equity and adequacy are open to shifting interpretation; Nick acknowledged that different advocates and attorneys will press various arguments but said the Gannon standard sets the current test. Members also asked specifically about the 92% special‑education excess‑cost reimbursement. Nick traced that figure to legislative responses in the Montoya litigation and confirmed the percentages (85%, 88%, 89.3% and then 92%) were adopted into statute over a sequence of appropriations and statutory changes intended to phase target funding levels.
Members also discussed the cumulative costs of litigation and the limited federal share of special‑education costs. Nick said attorney‑cost accounting would be handled by the Attorney General’s office and that he did not have an aggregate cost estimate. Several members urged learning from the litigation history to avoid repeating protracted court battles.
The briefing closed with staff offering additional materials in the committee drive and an offer to follow up on questions; the committee then moved on to other business and adjourned.
