Supreme Court hears challenge to left‑lane traffic stop in Norwood v. Commonwealth

At oral argument in Norwood v. Commonwealth, the justices questioned whether a driver traveling just under the posted speed limit in the left lane on an incline may be considered to be traveling "less than the normal speed of traffic," and whether Virginia Code "46 2 8 0 4 1" designates the left lane as a dedicated passing lane.

Eric Weathers, representing William Norwood, told the court he reserved five minutes for rebuttal and framed two discrete questions for the court: whether a vehicle going just under the speed limit up a steep incline can be treated as moving below the normal speed of traffic, and whether the cited code section treats the left lane as a dedicated passing lane. "Is it reasonable to believe that a driver going at and just under the speed limit up a steep incline is proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic?" Weathers asked. He urged the court to reverse the Court of Appeals and suppress the stop.

Bench questioning focused on the governing standard — reasonable articulable suspicion, not probable cause — and on hypothetical traffic scenarios. One questioner asked how long a driver could reasonably remain in the left lane without violating the statute and whether the posted speed limit should define the upper bound of the "normal" speed. Weathers argued the speed limit must be a core consideration and that Virginia law does not treat the left lane as a specialized passing lane in the way some other states do.

At several points the bench pressed the defense on edge cases. The justices posed hypotheticals — for example, a lone car traveling well below the limit on an otherwise clear interstate — to probe whether, under the statute's requirement to consider conditions "at the time and place," a single slow vehicle would suffice to create reasonable suspicion when no other traffic is impeded.

Several justices also raised the exclusionary‑rule and "good faith" concerns, asking whether officers who relied on prior precedent or reasonable interpretations of ambiguous law should be shielded from suppression. Weathers responded that reasonable‑mistake‑of‑law analysis is constrained by the text here and that good faith is "completely subsumed by reasonability" in this context; if the trooper's reading was not reasonable, he argued, suppression should follow.

Israel Healy, arguing for the Commonwealth, told the court the statute is intended to preserve left‑lane safety and prevent slower vehicles from creating hazards or blocking emergency traffic. He cited video and officer testimony, saying officers observed multiple vehicles pulling ahead and open lanes to the right while the vehicle in question remained below the limit "for at least a substantial period of the time." Healy emphasized that reasonable suspicion is a low bar and that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could form an articulable suspicion that the statute might be violated.

The bench questioned whether the statute requires actual impediment of traffic or simply a speed lower than the surrounding traffic, and whether an investigatory stop could yield useful additional information. Healy responded that weather was good in the recorded incident, the roadway included a steep incline and curve, and video evidence plus the officer's testimony provided additional articulable facts that supported reasonable suspicion.

Weathers used his reserved minute to reiterate that the question is whether "any reasonable officer could have taken in all of these facts and ... believed that the statute was being violated" and asked the court to reverse the Court of Appeals. The clerk called the next case without a decision announced from the bench.

The outcome will determine how courts and officers evaluate left‑lane driving when speeds hover near the posted limit and will clarify whether the Commonwealth's reading of the statute — and an officer's reasonable inferences from video and roadway conditions — are sufficient to justify investigatory stops under the Fourth Amendment.