Appellant’s counsel urges strict reading of six‑month no‑contact rule in Perkins v. Hovington

The Supreme Court heard argument in Perkins v. Hovington over whether a statutory six‑month no‑contact window alone determines when a birth parent has "without just cause" neither visited nor contacted a child, or whether courts may look beyond that window to the events that produced the no‑contact order.

Neal, the appellant’s counsel, told the justices that parental rights are fundamental and urged a narrow reading of the statute’s operative language: "No consent shall be required of a birth parent who, without just cause, has neither visited nor contacted the child for a period of 6 months immediately prior." He told the court, "If obeying court order to have no contact is not just cause under this statute, nothing is."

That position prompted a series of probing questions from multiple justices. One justice questioned whether historical practice requires looking at whether a parent’s own actions led to the no‑contact order — for example, conduct that resulted in protective orders or criminal sentences. The justices repeatedly asked counsel whether failures inside the six‑month period — such as missing court‑ordered drug screens or failing to file a bill of particulars — could justify the continuation of the no‑contact order and thus establish "just cause." As one justice put it, these are "strikes within the 6 months" that a trial court could count.

Neal acknowledged the record showed other failures but repeatedly distinguished them from the narrow statutory focus on contact. He said the appellant had taken steps to pursue visitation and had filed motions before and during the six‑month period. Neal emphasized the timing: the appellant began seeking relief before the six‑month window began, pursued court action during that window, and succeeded shortly after filing certain motions. He argued the trial court erred by relying on events that predated the immediately prior six‑month period rather than applying the statute's clear temporal limitation.

Justices pressed two related themes: (1) the practical question of whether strict application of the statute could encourage people to flout protective orders to preserve contact time, and (2) whether appellate review should defer to a trial court’s factfinding about "just cause." Neal warned against forcing parents to violate protective orders, and he urged the Court to give primary weight to the legislature’s phrasing because of the fundamental nature of parental rights. He also cited American Bar Association guidance about harms to children separated from parents and asked the Court to overturn the court of appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with a strict statutory reading.

The argument record reflects factual points the justices relied on during questioning: the no‑contact order issued in July; the appellant began challenging the order before the six‑month window identified by counsel (the briefs and filings indicate activity beginning Oct. 5 and the "immediately prior" six‑month period beginning Oct. 13); a motion for visitation was continued to April 15; the no‑contact order was dissolved on April 27. The justices noted the case was heard in a JDR context and that COVID‑era scheduling and coordination among multiple counsel and a guardian ad litem affected timing.

The Court recessed after the arguments and the bench directed the clerk to reflect that two justices did not sit on the case.