Court of Appeals hears argument over terminating alleged fathers’ parental rights under Washington law

A three‑judge panel of the Division 2 Court of Appeals heard argument over whether the state may terminate an alleged father's parental rights under RCW 13.34.180, focusing on whether the statute applies only to those who are already legal parents and on the practical routes to end a dependency when an alleged father refuses to participate.

Attorney Jennifer Dobson, representing the alleged father, told the court the statutory definition of "parent" unambiguously excludes alleged fathers and that current case law (referred to in argument as BHW) gives alleged fathers standing in dependency proceedings only until parentage is determined. "RCW 13.34.180 allows for the termination of parental rights, the relationship between a parent and a child," Dobson said, and argued the department cannot treat an alleged father as a parent for purposes of termination without first establishing parentage.

The panel repeatedly pressed Dobson on a practical question: how does a dependency end when an alleged father refuses genetic testing or otherwise digs in his heels? A judge asked, "how does the dependency end?" and raised possible enforcement mechanisms such as contempt proceedings or requiring the alleged father to withdraw; Dobson replied that the department had alternatives it did not pursue, including court enforcement of testing orders and that forcing a legal definition change would be a matter for the Legislature.

Brian Holland, counsel for the Department of Children, Youth, and Families, described DCYF's approach as pragmatic: the department provided services and opportunities for testing and explained that if the man were the biological father he "received all the process" and if he were not, he would be dismissed from the case. Holland said DCYF arranged multiple attempts at testing and cited RCW 26.33 (adoption statutes) as an alternative pathway that is sometimes available but not always practicable. He also pointed to precedent (KDS) for terminating parental rights without an adoptive placement where a stable permanent placement, rather than an adoptive home, is the goal.

Much of the argument turned on which party bears the burdens of proof and process in dependency cases. Dobson argued the state must establish that a person is a legal parent before asking a court to terminate parental rights. The panel and Holland discussed the role of parentage acknowledgments and Department of Health forms, with Holland noting those acknowledgments can be voided if multiple alleged fathers exist and that the Department of Health governs acknowledgments, not DCYF.

The court also explored consequences for a named individual who might later be shown not to be the biological father but would nonetheless carry a termination order on his record. Dobson emphasized that a termination against an alleged father who lacks an established legal interest imposes collateral consequences and argued that statutory ambiguity should not be resolved by judicial redefinition of "parent." Holland countered that the practical effect on permanency for the child can be similar under alternative statutory routes and that DCYF sought to balance protection of the child and reasonable procedures for indigent parents.

The panel did not issue a ruling at oral argument; the judges asked detailed questions about statutory text, prior case law, and practical remedies and thanked counsel for their arguments. The court’s decision will address whether RCW 13.34.180 can be applied to alleged fathers or whether termination must proceed under other statutory mechanisms or await legislative clarification.