Plaintiffs urge appeals court to revive negligence claims against Valley Communications Center

At oral argument in Other Court, Charles Berry, counsel for the plaintiffs, asked the court to reverse a trial-court dismissal under civil rule 12(b)(6) and remand so jurors can determine whether exceptions to the public-duty doctrine apply. "We are asking the court to reverse that ruling and remand this action back to the trial court," Berry said, arguing that plaintiffs' common-law negligence claims arise from a duty of reasonable care to refrain from causing harm.

The dispute centers on whether Valley Communications Center (VCC), a public safety answering point, owed an actionable duty to the victim (identified in filings as AK or Ms. Keith) or whether the public-duty doctrine — which shields duties owed to the public at large from tort liability — bars the claim. Stewart Cassello, counsel for VCC, told the court the doctrine is dispositive because the interlocal agreement that created VCC's obligations was approved by ordinance and therefore imposes a "special governmental obligation" to the public. "It's often phrased as a duty to all. It's a duty to no one," Cassello said.

Why it matters: The court's decision will affect whether plaintiffs may seek damages for alleged mistakes by 9-1-1 operators, including miscoding, early call termination, and failure to ask follow-up questions. Plaintiffs contend those actions — not mere inaction — were negligent and that factual questions (for example, whether a victim justifiably relied on a dispatcher’s assurance) cannot be resolved under Rule 12(b)(6).

During questioning, the panel probed two narrow exceptions plaintiffs rely on: the special-relationship exception (which requires privity or direct, justifiable reliance) and the rescue/misfeasance doctrine (which distinguishes negligent affirmative acts from mere failures to act). A judge pressed plaintiffs on whether there was an "express assurance" communicated to AK that she could have relied on; Berry responded with hypotheticals and case-law analogues in which a victim refrained from self-protective action after being told help was coming.

Cassello countered that the calls at issue were indistinct and, in the record, primarily made by a third party (Mr. Rausch, a hotel security employee), not by AK herself. He emphasized cases holding that specificity or direct communication to the person in need is required before privity or justifiable reliance will be found. Cassello also maintained that the record shows VCC answered and acted on the calls, and that plaintiffs' allegations — if characterized merely as failures to ask follow-up questions or to classify a call differently — sound in nonfeasance, which courts traditionally deem nonactionable.

On factual points flagged by counsel: plaintiffs said internal review records show the dispatcher did not ask follow-up questions and that a later emergency call (about 58 minutes after the first call) prompted an immediate police response — "about 6 or 7 police officers" arriving in roughly four minutes. Counsel also told the court that the Kent Police Department publicly stated that, after listening to the recordings, their response would have been different if they had received certain information earlier.

Both sides cited precedent in support of their positions and contrasted the record here with cases where victims themselves made repeated, specific reports identifying an assailant or where a dispatcher directly assured the person in need that officers were en route. Counsel for plaintiffs asked the court to treat those contrasts as factual disputes inappropriate for resolution on a 12(b)(6) motion and to allow development of the record on remand.

Argument concluded and the court moved to the next matter on the docket. The court did not announce a decision at the hearing; the panel will issue its ruling in due course.