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Appellate panel weighs whether trial court erred by declining competency evaluation in State v. Kane
Summary
In oral argument before the Other Court, appellant counsel argued recent evaluations and trial behavior created a reasonable cause to doubt Sean Kane’s competency under 2023 statutory amendments; the State countered that tangential or grandiose thinking does not show inability to understand charges or assist in a defense.
A panel of the Other Court heard oral argument in State v. Kane on whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to order a new competency evaluation for defendant Sean Kane.
Colin Patrick, appellate counsel at the Washington Appellate Project, argued the convictions should be reversed because recent competency evaluations and observed trial behavior create a reasonable cause to believe Kane was not competent to stand trial under the 2023 amendments. "There are multiple competency evaluations within the last year identifying symptoms and barriers to competency," Patrick told the panel, citing derailed thought processes, grandiose and persecutory thinking and a finding that Kane is at risk of decompensation in jail.
The importance of the statutory change was a central point in argument. Patrick said the 2023 revisions clarify that a competency evaluation must be ordered when there is a "genuine doubt" — defined in the statute as a reasonable cause to believe, based on observations or information provided by counsel, that the defendant may not be competent.
Ian Eth, representing the State of Washington, urged the court to affirm. Eth said that tangential thinking, grandiosity or pomposity are not the same as incompetence and emphasized the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard on appeal. "He made sense," Eth said of Kane’s trial performance, adding that the trial court conducted a "colloquy" and concluded Kane understood the charges and could represent himself.
Panel questioning focused on the line between exhibiting symptomology and showing that symptoms affected Kane’s ability to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. One judge asked whether symptomology alone suffices or whether the evidence must show how those symptoms interfered with the specific functional abilities that underlie competency, such as recalling facts and communicating with counsel.
Patrick countered that the record contains a sequence of evidence — prior findings of incompetence, later evaluations identifying the same symptomology, and an expert's warning about decompensation — that, taken together, establish reasonable cause to doubt competence. He urged the panel to treat the question as a threshold factual determination distinct from the ultimate merits of conviction.
Eth and other panelists stressed moments during trial when Kane conducted voir dire, objected, cross-examined and made tactical motions, arguing those moments demonstrated he assisted in his defense. Eth also noted post-trial defense counsel reviewed the transcript and described Kane as "clearly competent" during the jury trial.
In rebuttal, Patrick emphasized examples from the evaluations and the record that, he said, showed a veneer of lucidity masking underlying barriers to competence. He pointed to an evaluator's description of grandiose and persecutory thinking and a specific notation in the clerk's papers that Kane could decompensate in custody.
The panel concluded oral argument without issuing a decision. The court will take the matter under advisement and issue a written opinion at a later date.
