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Appeals court hears dispute over whether police lights contributed to crash in Robin Liram case
Summary
In oral argument, plaintiff counsel said a jury could infer that officers’ conduct — including activation of lights and a change in speed — helped cause a fatal crash; counsel for Seattle and Bellevue said there is no admissible, non‑speculative evidence that the driver saw police or materially changed his driving.
Andy Olmer, attorney for plaintiff-appellant Robin Liram, told an appellate panel that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment by finding no causal link between officers’ conduct and the ensuing crash.
Olmer said the record contains circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a jury question about proximate causation: Officer Davenport testified he activated forward-facing emergency lights “to warn vehicles ahead of him,” the plaintiff’s experts measured a roughly 10‑mile‑per‑hour speed increase between the point the officers began their conduct and the moment before impact, and accident‑reconstruction expert Dr. Bauer challenged a defense claim that a hill crest would have prevented the fleeing driver from seeing the officers. “It would be unjust to say there is no negligent-pursuit case where a fleeing suspect perishes following a negligent pursuit,” Olmer argued, asking the court to reverse and remand.
Responding for the City of Seattle, Rebecca Ladeen said the plaintiff lacks admissible evidence that Oscar Hernandez Balestrano saw the officers or materially altered his driving. Ladeen told the panel that plaintiff experts’ causation opinions relied in part on hearsay statements from the driver and passenger and therefore are speculative. “There is simply no admissible non speculative evidence here that [the driver] ever saw Officer Davenport behind him,” Ladeen said.
Chad Barnes, representing the City of Bellevue, described the event as unfolding within seconds — he said 7 to 28 seconds elapsed from when Hernandez entered the roadway to the crash — and emphasized that opportunity to observe officers does not prove the driver actually perceived a pursuit. Barnes also pointed out that Officer Welty activated rear lights but not forward‑facing lights that would have been visible to a driver ahead, arguing that proof of perception and understanding is necessary to show a pursuit caused the crash.
The panel and counsel debated the reach of the court’s recent 2024 decision in Harder. Olmer urged that the factual differences here distinguish Harder and that where officers’ conduct and expert testimony create reasonable inferences about visibility, speed change, and agency policy violations, a jury should decide causation. Defense counsel countered that the plaintiff’s theory asks jurors to draw speculative inferences beyond admissible evidence.
The arguments focused on three evidentiary points: (1) testimony that lights were activated and whether they were visible to the driver; (2) competing expert estimates about vehicle speed (plaintiff cited a report estimating ~50 mph as the Mercedes passed officers and a defense expert opining speeds in excess of 60 mph immediately before impact, which Olmer characterized as a ~10 mph increase); and (3) experts’ differing reconstructions of roadway visibility (Olmer said Dr. Bauer rebutted a claim that a hill crest prevented sight of officers). The plaintiff also cited BPD policy 3.0.01 and a trailing‑pursuit definition as relevant to whether officers’ conduct fit an agency definition of pursuit.
No formal ruling was issued on the record in this transcript. The panel’s questions and closing remarks indicated they are examining whether the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence is admissible and sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The transcript ends after counsel’s closing remarks; the court’s decision is not recorded here.
Clarifying details extracted from the argument include the time window cited by defense counsel (7–28 seconds from roadway entry to crash, with one range said to be 14–22 seconds), speed estimates cited by counsel (~50 mph as the Mercedes passed the officers; defense expert opining in excess of 60 mph just before impact), and references to BPD policy 3.0.01 and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) characterization of a “ghosted pursuit.”
The transcript records named counsel and unidentified bench members asking questions; it does not contain a final decision or written opinion.
