Appeals court hears argument that judge's inaction created appearance of unfairness in State v. Lester

An appellate panel heard competing arguments over whether a trial judge's response to an allegation about victim-advocate conduct deprived Christopher Lester of a fair trial.

Eleanor Knowles, speaking for Lester, told the court she would focus on the appearance-of-fairness issue and asked the court to reverse his convictions. Knowles said the judge received a report from a court employee that she believed she overheard a victim advocate from an organization called New Hope make a comment suggesting a signal to a child witness. Knowles said the trial judge decided not to act on the report, later told the parties he had forgotten about it, and never brought it to the parties' attention during the proceedings. "Had Mr. Lester's attorney not bumped into this other judge in the parking lot, he never would have found out about it," Knowles said, arguing that the judge's inaction created an appearance-of-unfairness warranting reversal under Sherman v. State.

Responding for the state, Rebecca Kahler said trial judges have wide courtroom-management discretion and that the information the judge received appeared to be a random, overheard comment with no record evidence tying it to the trial. "There is no obligation where there's mere speculation," Kahler told the bench, arguing that absent corroboration the judge did not abuse his discretion in how he handled the matter. She characterized the later acknowledgement by the judge that he might have handled the matter differently as hindsight, not proof of bias.

The attorneys debated the proper standard for review. Knowles urged the Sherman objective, reasonable-person test for appearance of fairness: whether a reasonably prudent and disinterested person, aware of all relevant facts, would conclude the proceeding was fair. The state emphasized an abuse-of-discretion standard for courtroom management and warned that treating every speculative report as an appearance-of-fairness violation would invite gamesmanship.

Knowles stressed that the state's case relied heavily on child testimony and personnel from New Hope, including a forensic interviewer who testified as an expert and a dog handler and victim advocates who accompanied witnesses. She argued that, particularly in a bench trial where the judge was the factfinder, the judge's stated belief that New Hope "would never be doing something like this in his courtroom" and his subsequent failure to disclose or to rule on a motion for a new trial or recusal undermined confidence in the outcome.

Bench members queried whether a finding of a judicial-canon violation necessarily mandates reversal and whether a later evidentiary hearing on the allegation changes the appellate inquiry. The transcript shows the trial judge deferred ruling on the new-trial and recusal motions pending an evidentiary hearing and never issued a ruling; counsel asked the appellate panel to review that procedural history in determining relief.

The court heard argument on statutory and case-law authorities cited by both sides, including Sherman v. State and what counsel referred to as Tatham (Tatham v. Rogers). The argument concluded and the court moved to the next matter on its docket.

Next steps: The appellate panel did not announce a disposition during the argument; the court proceeded to the next scheduled case.