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Appellate panel hears arguments in Condell v. Condell over renewal of domestic-violence protection order
Summary
A panel heard oral argument on whether a trial court improperly denied renewal of a domestic-violence protection order. Counsel disputed the interpretation of RCW 7.105.405, the weight to give a private evaluator’s report, and whether the trial court relied on prohibited factors in denying renewal.
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A panel of judges heard oral argument in Condell v. Condell on whether a domestic-violence protection order renewal entered 05/24/2024 should be reversed and reinstated through 05/24/2030. Appellant counsel Rachael Nassar urged reversal, saying the trial court misapplied RCW 7.105.405 by treating a finding that the respondent "will not resume acts of domestic violence" as proof of the separate required showing of a "substantial change in circumstances." Nassar reserved two minutes for rebuttal.
Nassar told the court that RCW 7.105.405 is written conjunctively and that the statute requires two independent showings before renewal may be denied. She argued that treating the finding of non-recidivism as sufficient to prove substantial change would render the statutory requirement for a separate showing of change superfluous. She cited several authorities she says do not support conflating the two elements and told the panel the trial court relied on prohibited factors, including findings about a lack of criminal acts and comments about the sincerity of an apology, in denying renewal.
A judge questioned the role and language of a private evaluator’s report prepared by Dr. Singer, specifically the portion stating the agency "defers to the court" and that the report should not be used for family, civil, or criminal court unless tailored to that purpose. Nassar responded that the language appears to be a liability-protecting disclaimer and argued it should be given no weight where it contradicts the court’s prior findings and the court-ordered treatment regimen.
Respondent counsel Nelson Sperity defended the trial court’s decision as reasonable under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Sperity told the panel there is "no real dispute" that his client will not resume acts of domestic violence and argued that finding, together with other changes Sperity identified in his brief, amply satisfied the statutory standard for substantial change. He also emphasized practical consequences: he said the level-0 assessment Dr. Singer issued made his client ineligible for certain court-ordered DV treatment programs, and that the respondent completed what the evaluator recommended given that assessment.
The judges pressed both sides on how to reconcile the assessment language with the trial court’s orders and whether mandated treatment remains a required step when an assessor assigns level 0. Appellate questioning also focused on whether the trial court’s later credibility findings about the original petitioner contradicted the basis for the first protection order. Appellant counsel pointed the panel to a letter in the clerk’s papers (CP 677) that the respondent did not complete the organization's assessment and therefore was not eligible to enroll with that provider, and reiterated that the trial court made findings that the appellant says are expressly prohibited by statute.
Neither side asked for a specific oral decision; the argument concluded and the panel recessed. The court did not issue a ruling from the bench during the proceeding. The next procedural step will be issuance of a written opinion or order from the court at a later date.
